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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
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Implications of Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: the Nature of the 
New Border, set up jointly by the Robert Schuman Centre and the Forward 
Studies Unit of the European Commission, and chaired by Professor Giuliano 
Amato. The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre are 
not responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author. For 
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For most of the period between 1992-2000 the Czech Republic was excessively 
praised for its achievements and for the rest of the time (partly excessively as 
well) criticised for its flaws.
The generally favourably relations towards the country were based on its 
remarkable political and economic stability during most of the 90s. Against the 
background of Balkan war, the peaceful and largely orderly dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia was appreciated. Even if the split has not been welcomed, its 
management contributed to the image of the country as well organised and 
largely compatible with western standards. The Czech Republic does not have 
territorial disputes with its neighbours, it became ethnically nearly homogenous 
(a feature, which may be interpreted as a historical failure as well as temporary 
advantage). In 1993, it had the least indebted economy among the CEE 
countries, with inflation, being slowly curbed, low unemployment rate and 
liberal foreign trade. Last but not least, its attractive leadership helped to 
introduce the old-new country: President Vaclav Havel, leader of the ’’velvet 
revolution” 1989 and best known and most acknowledged personality to the 
East of Elbe; Premier Vaclav Klaus, eloquent self-confident technocrat with an 
image of high competence and efficiency. The confidence in prospects of the 
economic growth and further enhancement of political stability was high.
However, there were serious flaws in the generally positive picture. The 
turmoil of 1997 proved what the critics had expected: the transformation of the 
country has been at least partly mismanaged and it’s pace increased only 
gradually. Moreover, the ’’golden age” of Czech stability -  the years of 1993- 
1996 - was the most problematic time of Prague’s integration policy. The burden 
placed under considerable pressure the subsequent governments of Tosovsky 
and Zeman, limited moreover by their weak positions in the parliament, lack of 
time and small room for manoeuvre. Vaclav Klaus and the ODS, however, 
remained a point within the narrow Czech political firmament.
The following article represents neither a profound political analysis nor 
the result of a long term research endeavour.1 It is rather a brief reflection on the
1 For an profound analysis of theoretical and political aspects of Czech integration policy 
1992-1996 see Anneke Hudalla: “Der Beitritt der Tschechischen Republik zur Europaischen 
Union: eine Fallstudie zu den Auswirkungen der EU-Osterweiterung auf die finalité politique 
des europaischen Integrationsprozesses”. Hamburg, Lit, 1997, 199 pp. For assessment of 
readiness of the Czech Republic to access to the EU see Marga Jennewein, Kristina 
Larischova: Czech Republic. In: Wemer Weidenfeld (ed.): Central and Eastern Europe on the 



























































































political aspects of the evolution of Czech integration policy over recent years.2 
In order to introduce the reader to Czech integration policy the author will try to 
set a broader picture of Czech political development and thus create the context 
within which the gradual maturation of Czech integration policy took place. The 
article will focus on three periods - 1992-1996 or the time of both stability and 
stagnation, the turbulent year of 1997 and on the present period of the 
transformation and integration process, starting from early 1998. The 
conclusions will sum up some of the findings as well as pose further questions.
Development of a Democratic State
The Czech republic perceives itself as a medium size European country. It is 
dependent on international co-operation not least due to its size, geographic 
position in the heart of Europe, economic parameters and the fact that its export 
and services amount up to 55% of its GDP.3
It represents in general terms an established parliamentary democracy. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms represents a part of the 
constitutional system (Art. 112).4 The Czech Republic is a party to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (since 1992) and its additional 
protocols. It became a member of the Council of Europe 1993 and 
acknowledges jurisdiction of the European Court. The country shares, however, 
a number of problems with some democratic states and especially with the 
transition countries of the former Eastern block - low efficiency and functioning 
of some public institutions, distortions of their politico-economic co­
earlier and later yearly reports in the same project edition.
2 The article is based on authors presentation for seminar on Czech integration into the EU, 
held on 10.1.1998 in European University Institute, Florence. The author thanks participants 
of the seminar for their stimulating comments, which helped him to complete the paper. 
Special thanks belong to Professor Jan Zielonka for his invitation to participate at the seminar 
and to prepare the paper for publication.
The author extends his thanks also to Ing.Kristina Larischova, Dr.Petr Pavlik and Vladimir 
Dolezal for the opportunity to use the documentation on Czech integration policy (1996- 
1998), based at the Institute for International Relations, Prague. He also found the 
documentation on Czech foreign policy, prepared by Dr. Ivona Rezankova and Ivana Litosova 
at the same Institute, very helpful.
Special thanks belong to Stuart Philip, Institute for German Studies, Birmingham and Alex 
Zaitchik, Institute of International Relations, Prague for their friendly corrections of the 
earlier versions of the text. The author is responsible for all remaining mistakes in this final 
version.
3 Concept O f The Foreign Policy Of The Czech Republic (1999), 
http://www.czech.cz/english/textd.htm





























































































ordination. At the same time, the Czech Republic obviously faces a number of 
specific problems. The political constellation of 1992-1996 postponed 
implementation of some provisions of Czech constitutional order. While the 
Chamber of Deputies (200 members) has been elected in 1990, 1992, 1996 and 
1998 (proportional representation system), the upper Chamber - the Senate (81 
members), equipped with much less powers - was only established in 
November 1996. There is no special provision for the representation of 
minorities in Parliament. An Administrative Supreme Court has still not been 
established. The country is divided into 75 administrative districts. In addition to 
communes, the constitution stipulated establishment of self-governing regions. 
The relevant law on establishment of higher administrative units was adopted 
only in 1997. The new fourteen units will start functioning in 2001. The 
judiciary is independent. It lags, however, behind the need to process an 
increasing number of cases mainly in commercial sphere. The police only partly 
copes with the dramatic increase in all types of crime, including cross-border, 
international and organised ones. The organisation of the secret service, its 
efficiency and democratic control of its activities have never ceased to be a 
topic of political and public debate. The general assessment of the legal system 
indicates that its evolution was more chaotic than systematic. The result was a 
low level of transparency, legal protection of citizens and there is therefore a 
lack of public confidence in law and order. Current shortcomings 
notwithstanding, the democratic rules of the country have never been contested.
Early post-1989 Years.
The early years of post-1989 Czechoslovak development witnessed some major 
steps of political and economic transformation of the country: basis of 
democratic order and market economy with highly developed social element has 
been laid down. In international affairs Czechoslovakia restored its sovereignty: 
it negotiated withdrawal of the soviet troops by June 1990. In close co-operation 
with its regional partners - Poland and Hungary - it brought the CMEA and the 
WTO to an end (June/July 1991). Prague launched several initiatives within the 
CSCE, concluded an Association Agreement with the EC (December 1991) and 
major bilateral treaties with its neighbours (except Austria). However, very soon 
both the transformation process as well as active foreign policy became 
burdened by the prominence of the relations between Czech and Slovak political 
leadership.
The federation of Czechs and Slovaks disrupted as a result of parallel 
influence of a number of factors - an upswing of Slovak national emancipation, 
highly asynchronic processes of economic and social transformation in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics. In June 1992, the elections established hardly 




























































































right coalition in the Czech and a centre-left coalition in the Slovak republics 
pursued very different concepts of transformation and further constitutional 
development. At the same time they had some features in common - they 
preferred pragmatic, ’’fast” and ’’cheap” solutions which would not endanger 
their governing position, neglecting overwhelming public opinion in both parts 
of the country. The time horizon of their decisions was essentially limited by 
one or two election periods. The split of the country has fallen within the logic 
of this political thinking.
1 .1992-1996 BETWEEN STABILITY AND STAGNATION.
1.1 GENERAL REFLECTION
The government of the centre-right coalition, lead by the Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS, headed by its Chairman and the first Czech Premier, charismatic Vaclav 
Klaus) and composed of three smaller parties (Christian Democratic Party - 
KDS, which later merged with the ODS; Christian Democratic Union/Czech 
People’s Party - KDU-CSL; Civic Democratic Alliance - ODA) received 105 of 
200 seats in the chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament in June 1992. It 
enjoyed stable majority until the general election in June 1996. The disunited 
opposition parties (Czech Social Democratic Party - CSSD, the communist led 
coalition of left parties Left Block - LBL, and Association for Republic- 
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia - SPR-RSC) could not endanger the 
position of the coalition. The period was, therefore characterised by stability, 
both real and alleged.
The political constellation, theoretically, could have been used for 
implementation of a radical transformation of the country including extensive 
legislative activity. This was, however, only partly the case. On the one hand, 
the government was successful in setting the exchange-rate policy, managing 
public finance policy and opening of the economy. The positive impact of these 
decisive measures was indisputable.5 On the other hand, the laissez-faire state 
concept of Czech liberals combined with national populist approaches 
(postponement of critical structural changes, cautious approach to FDI) was not 
able to launch consequent transformation within a prudent legal and institutional 
framework. The national economy passed the phase of transformation 
depression by 1993 and experienced short economic growth in 1994-1995. 
During the first phase the GDP decreased by 21%.6 Industrial production 
contracted to 68,3% of the level of 1990 in 1993 and gross agriculture
5 Pavel Kysilka, “Ceska ekonomika vyrusta ze svych problemu” (Czech Economy Growing 
Out of Its Problems), Hospodarske noviny, 5.12.2000, p.13.
6 These and following data are based on the “Zprava vlady o stavu ceske spolecnosti” 




























































































production even more. The social burden of the unprecedented economic 
decrease in modem Czech history was not dramatic with unemployment at the 
level of 3,5% in 1993. The reason was mainly a lack of structural changes in 
industrial production and expansion of the third sector of the national economy. 
During 1992-1996period GDP increased by 14%, industrial production reached 
80,7% of the level of 1990 in 1996 (a positive development, not shared in the 
agricultural sector).
The “small privatisation” (property worth of roughly 23 bill Koruna) 
enhanced development of small businesses and services. Roughly one third of 
the total property meant for the so called “large privatisation” (total property 
involved in the large privatisation was worth of 934 bill Koruna) was privatised 
by the so called voucher method. The latter turned out to be a genial political 
manoeuvre, which enhanced political position of the government but ended with 
highly controversial economic results. Nonetheless, throughout most of the years 
1992 -1996, general economic and political stability was maintained, being 
acknowledged by international community and appreciated by the Czech 
population. Support for the government was overwhelming.
The integration policy of the Czech government was characterised by a 
certain dichotomy - declaratory distance from the EU on the one hand and 
growing involvement of the government into the association and pre-accession 
process on the other. General political and economic stability created a 
background for a self-confident and even patronising position of some Czech 
politicians vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbours and even vis-à-vis the EU. As 
mounting problems were to show, starting with 1995/1996 in a number of key 
areas, the government failed to create a solid basis for a modem democratic 
society and market economy. The growing disparity of the external balance, 
indicated mounting economic problems, which were to explode in 1997. As a 
result, the process of Czech transformation slowed down, economic 
performance became more and more problematic and the reserve of political 
stability started to decrease. By June 1996 critical voices were gaining more 
attention. While during the general election in June 1992 the ODS gained 29.7% 
and its rival, the CSSD, only 6,53% votes, so the support for the ODS remained 
the same during the next general election in June 1996 (29,6%), while the CSSD 
gained an unprecedented 26,4%. The election results raised the Social 
Democracy to the position of the second strongest party challenging more and 
more the leading position of the ODS. The centre right coalition remained in 
power but did not gain a majority in the lower chamber of the Parliament.7





























































































1.2 THE CZECH FOREIGN POLICY
Czech foreign policy has, in general terms, followed similar lines since 
1990/1991: the westward orientation of the state has never been seriously 
questioned either by the political class, the business community or by the 
general public. Essentially public opinion has always perceived foreign policy as 
the best managed element of the government’s policy agenda.8
At the same time the macroeconomic focus of the Czech conservative 
government (June 1992- November 1997), laissez-faire state and state-centred 
view of international relations, resulted in a visible shift in many aspects of 
Czech foreign policy during 1992-1993. While in most areas of domestic policy 
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus behaved as an “orthodox neo-liberal” and 
“methodological individualist”9, in foreign policy his government turned away 
from an institutionalist focus towards a neo-realist sceptical approach and a 
heavily accented sense of national interest. That shift found reflection in an 
ambivalent approach to multilateral institutions as well as to neighbouring states 
- a rather peculiar concept for an ever smaller country, increasingly dependent 
on multilateral arrangements and external conditions. The move towards realism 
resulted in considerable loss to the international standing of the Czech Republic 
and added to the obvious decrease in prestige and influence of the state after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992.
Nonetheless, we want to argue that Czech foreign policy has undergone a 
process of positive maturity post 1992: it travelled the long road from neo­
realist emphasis to the mainstream thinking preferring institutionalist solutions 
on both bilateral and multilateral levels of international relations. Prime Minister 
Josef Tosovsky (December 1997) could in many ways maintain continuity in 
foreign policy with the late phase of the first independent Czech government.
Most visible - even if not spectacular - was the increase of co-operative 
elements in Czech foreign policy. Indeed, Prague has no territorial disputes with 
its neighbours whatsoever. This is true also for relations with Germany and 
Slovakia, even if they witnessed other specific problems at the same time.
8 A special public opinion research proved in 1994 that 71% perceived the performance of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as good. See Verejne rnmeni o zahranicm politice Czech 
Republic a Ministerstvu zahranicnich veci (Public Opinion on Foreign Policy of the Czech 
Republic and on Ministry of Foreign Affairs), DEMA, August 1994, p. 3. Early 1997 69% 
assessed government’s foreign policy as good. See: Trendy 4-1997, STEM. We want to argue, 
however, that the highly positive perception is at least partially explained by the obvious lack 
of alternatives in foreign policy orientation and by the fact, that international affairs have not 
been high on the agenda of the public - except for relations with Germany.
9 Martin Potucek, “Tezke znovuzrozeni: obcansky sektor v Ceske republice”, (A Difficult 




























































































Primarily in 1992-1994, the Czech government’s relations with its neighbours 
were affected by the way in which it perceived international politics. The 
impression was that the government departed in its political preferences from 
the geopolitical and economic reality. The US (less so after the election success 
of the Clinton administration) and the UK (before Blair came into office) had 
been high on the agenda of political relations, whereas closer neighbours seemed 
to be less attractive.10
The agenda concerning Czech relations with Slovakia included issues, the 
resolution of which was burdened by the fact of the inborn difference of 
political landscape and resulting political developments in both states. The 
influence of personalities on policy making played a special role. Both Czech 
and Slovak policies have been influenced by the authoritative political style of 
their governing parties and especially their Chairmen. Vaclav Klaus and his 
Slovak counterpart Vladimir Meciar were most successful in agreeing on the 
fact that they could not come to an agreement - a quality bound to lead to the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992. Prague and Bratislava could not even 
come to a settlement of the residual issues of division of the former federal 
property. The mutual relations only partly maintained a character of a special, 
non-standard relationship. Nonetheless Prague and Bratislava succeeded in 
negotiating a treaty on adjustment of their common border (January 1996).
It is probably not correct to blame only Czech policy for the disruption of 
Visegrad co-operation. For Prague, the lack of readiness of other partners to co­
ordinate in cases where their interests collided with those of the EC or Germany 
was the test-case of purposefulness of further deepening of the co-operation.11 
The Czech conservative government, with a certain element of pride and 
satisfaction, put a lid on the level of regional co-operation in 1993. Prague 
seriously damaged its image as a constructive partner in international relations 
and its behaviour as a ’’superior” to the rest of the group produced negative
10 Czech diplomacy even mentioned possibility to use liberalisation of trade with the USA as 
a means of pressure against restrictive elements in trade policy of EC - see e.g.Minister Josef 
Zieleniec on 23.9.1992 in: Zahranicni Politika Ceske Republiky. Data. Ministerstvo zahranici 
Ceske Republiky. (Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic. Documents. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Prague): 9/92 (further only: Data) p.611; the idea was connected with a proposal of 
Bush Administration of September 1992 to create a free-trade-zone with Central-East 
European countries.
11 In mid 1993 Prague sought a common position of Visegrad states vis-à-vis the EC in the 
case of temporary embargo on meat exports into the EC. It also tried to put through a 
regional, multilateral settlement to illegal migration on border with Germany, while Bonn - 
being under the pressure of time - wanted to conclude bilateral treaties. In both cases the other 
Visegrad states preferred individual way of dealing with the problems and did not explore the 




























































































feelings in the whole region. We argue, however, that Czech government policy 
vis-à-vis its neighbours became gradually more active. Without its active 
support, CEFTA would have not become operational in a rather short time. On a 
working level, regional co-operation proceeded within OSCE, in Vienna, where 
national delegations of the Visegrad states took turns in representing the 
interests of the group.12 Since 1995 an active approach to relations with Poland 
has gained an upper hand. Clearly, Prague took notice of the fact, that it was 
Poland which played the strategic role in the process of NATO and EU 
enlargement.
The conservative government in Prague, however, did not develop any 
specific closeness with Germany. The differences in approach of the newly neo­
realist Czech and traditionally institutionalist German governments seemed to 
prevail for several years. Nonetheless Prague as a whole has slowly but steadily 
moved towards a more balanced approach to its German neighbour. The need to 
come to terms with Bonn/Berlin became more and more evident. One of the 
motives was the fact that Czech accession to the EU (and NATO) might to a 
great extent depend on a high level of German support. Another, not less 
important consideration, was the fact that without a reconciliation with Germany 
Czech public opinion would hardly support the idea of joining the EU given that 
Germany was perceived as a dominant, and potentially domineering, power 
within that structure.13 Prague, in a concerted effort by the President and the 
government, sought to provide for a more solid basis in dealing with the past in 
mutual German-Czech relations. The negotiations for a bilateral declaration in 
1995-1997 proved to be much more difficult than originally expected as 
Germany apparently raised, for the first time, the demands of the Sudeten 
German community (“Heimatrecht”). The Czech-German Declaration on the 
Mutual Relations and their Future Development of January 1997, signed by 
Vaclav Klaus and Helmut Kohl, was a well balanced document. Even if it did 
not close Sudeten German property demands in legal terms, it expressed a 
political will on both sides not to burden mutual relations with issues originating 
in the past.14_In doing so the German government de-facto gave up its demands 
to implement the so-called Heimatrecht, while the Czech government expressed
12 Conversation of the author with the former Czech Ambassador to the OSCE Zdenek 
Matejka, Prague, October 1996. An official recognition of this praxis would, however, cause 
severe criticism given the fact that "Visegrad" did not exist according to the Czech 
government.
3 Vztahy ceské spolecnosti k Nemecku. Vysledky representativniho selreni v Czech Republic 
(Relations of Czech Society towards Germany. Results of Representative Opinion Research.). 
Nadace Friedricha Naumanna (Freidrich Naumann Foundation) Gabal Analysis & 
Consulting. Praha 13.7.1995.
14 For a brief analysis see Vladimir Handl, Czech-German Declaration on Reconciliation, 



























































































its regret over the victims of the transfer/expulsion of Sudeten German 
population.
1.3 POLITICAL PROGRAMMES OF THE CZECH PARTIES ON 
INTEGRATION
The political programmes of the individual Czech parties proved that the 
perception of the EU were rather general in the Czech Republic. However, the 
problem was not solely a problem of the EU or NATO. Foreign policy had a 
secondary role in Czech policymaking. The party that devoted most attention to 
foreign policy was traditionally the Communist party. Nonetheless, in the 
somewhat short and “secondary” sections of the programmes on foreign and 
security policy, which produced the other parties, the EU and NATO plaid a 
prominent role.
The ODS, headed by Vaclav Klaus, regarded relations with the EU as priority. It 
was much less clear to what extent fully-fledged membership of the EU, 
envisaged in the 1992 election programme, was really a priority in early 1990 or 
whether it became a priority later.15 Moreover, the party, dominated by its 
Chairman, was never fully unanimous. For most of the time the Vice-Chairman, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Josef Zieleniec, was clearly more “EU-oriented” 
than other members of the party’s leadership.
Mainly, but not exclusively, Prime Minister Klaus took a position, closely 
linked with that of the British Conservatives. The nation-state (in a centralist 
form) was perceived as a value “an sich”.16 There are some indications that 
Vaclav Klaus and his closest aides in early 1990 may not have considered full 
Czech membership in the EU as the only option. An arrangement, similar to the 
Swiss model of relations with the EU (European Economic Area) seemed to be 
highly attractive.17 The reserved position on EU matters was manifested by the 
timing of the Czech EU application. Vaclav Klaus postponed the act from 
Spring 1994, when Hungary and Poland handed over their applications, until 
January 1996. Some experts perceive Vaclav Klaus’ speech in July 1995 in 
Cannes as a late reflection of the Premier’s position on the membership issue.
15 Full membership has been declared the objective of the ODS even in its first political 
programme document Cesta k prosperite (The Road to Prosperity), published in April 1991. 
See: M.Mares, Ceske politicke strany a zahranicni politika (Czech Political Parties and 
Foreign Policy), Mezinarodni vztahy (International Affairs, Prague): 1/1999
16 The Political Programme of the ODS favours membership in the EU but stresses that the 
party did not want to dilute the Czech state in supranational structures arising without any 
deep roots and real identity. See Politicky program ODS. Praha 2.11.1995 (Political Program 
of the ODS).




























































































In his speech he openly acknowledged that there was no alternative to the EU 
membership for the Czech Republic.18 His party however still did not offer any 
coherent vision of the EU: it avoided substantial internal debate and did not 
further one in public. In the 1996 election programme full membership of the 
EU certainly was “the main foreign policy goal of the ODS”, however, the 
programme stressed that integration could not suppress the diversity of member 
states, nations and cultures. In the view of the ODS individual member 
represented the basis of the EU further on; “the sovereignty and competencies of 
the Union will be derived from the sovereignty and competencies of the 
individual states”.19 Vaclav Klaus maintained has maintained his opinion 
throughout the decade and stressed, after his resignation in November 1997 as a 
re-elected Chairman of the ODS, the need to preserve (Czech) national identity 
and to limit the “unionist elements” in the EU.20
The ODA, headed by Jan Kalvoda, later Jiri Skalicky and Daniel Kroupa, 
started from very similar positions to those of the ODS. However, it gradually 
moved to a “Europeanist”, and even a “federalist”, position on integration. 
While in 1992 and 1993 its leading politicians, like Minister of Industry and 
Trade, Dlouhy, revealed their close affinity to the Thatcherist concept of the EU, 
by 1995 and 1996 both Minister Dlouhy and Minister of Justice Jan Kalvoda 
issued clearly federalist statements.21 In its 1996 election programme the ODA 
rejected “an a priori disapproval of further increase of competencies of 
supranational institutions of the EU.”22 Being a liberal party, the ODA was 
cautious as far as the EU mechanisms of redistribution are concerned.
The KDU-CSL (Christian-democratic Union - Czech Peoples Party), 
headed by Josef Lux, never was especially critical about the EU, except for 
some particular issues of agricultural policy. It was, however, rather reserved 
and did not pay much attention to the foreign policy, among other things thanks
18 "..the Czech Republic has no alternative to the membership in the European Union. Our 
foreign policy as well as our domestic policy orientation are based fully on it." Vaclav Klaus: 
Notes fo r Cannes Summit Speech. June 27, 1995, p.l.
19 Bezpecnost a prosperity. Volebni program ODS. Parlamentni volby 1996 (Security and 
Prosperity. Election Programme of the ODS. General Elections, 1996), p.l 1.
20 Klaus: Vstupem do EU nechceme prijit o svou identitu. (Klaus: With the Accession to the 
EU We Do Not Want to Lose Our Identity). Ceske Noviny (CTK), 12.3.1998
21 Minister Dlouhy being, like Minister Zieleniec, most "exposed” to intensive contacts with 
the EU, gathered enough personal experience and established close links with EU 
representatives. He expressed his support to "federalist” nature of European integration in an 
article, published 1.7.1995 in Mlada Fronta Dnes.
22 See: Dal na ceste ke svobodne spolecnosti - Smlouva pro budoucnost. Volebni progam 
ODA (1996), (Further on the Way to Free Society - Agreement for the Future. Election 




























































































to lack of highest party representatives with interest in foreign policy. The 
concept of a federal EU, including social elements, solidarity and redistribution, 
found support of the party, its programme was, however, extremely general in 
its foreign policy section.23 In its focus the party became very close to the 
position of the Christian-Democratic parties of the EU.
The opposition CSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party), headed by Milos 
Zeman took, in principle, a pro-European position welcoming especially its 
redistributive elements and social model anchored in the Social Charter. 
However, representing the middle and lower class, the Social Democrats were 
more inclined to protect areas of the Czech economy, notably those where 
structural reform has not taken place yet.24 Being positive about regional and 
all-European co-operation (incl. security) Social Democrat grass roots tend to be 
rather “traditionalist” in their perception of Germany as an eventual ’’threat”. 
The links of the party with other social-democratic parties enhanced its 
European orientation. Those contacts, however, did not prevent the party from 
acting as a ’’guardian” of the national economy and of national interests, nor 
deter it from support of protective measures. Reflecting the position of its grass 
roots on the one hand and the ambivalent position of the government on the 
other, the party (as all other parties as well) committed itself to a public vote on 
membership of the EU. As the party did not succeed in its attempt to push the 
constitutional legislation on a public vote through parliament in October 1997 it 
stopped insisting on a referendum in the case of NATO membership. It was 
clear it would have to argue more strongly in favour of the referendum on EU 
membership in order to confirm its popular identity.
Unlike the parties of the centre right or the centre left, the KSCM 
(Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), headed by Miroslav Grebenicek 
and the SPR-RPC (Republican Party), headed by Miroslav Sladek opposed the 
EU-model of integration, perceiving it as a tool of German domination. 
Nonetheless, at least the Communist party perceived Czech participation in the 
integration process as inevitable, but sought ’’amendment” of the Maastricht 
treaty mainly in terms of its démocratisation. A looser model of integration was 
perceived as preferable whereby the EU would consist of several groupings of 
states. The ’’more advanced states” of the East Central Europe could represent 
one of these groupings.25
23 KDU-CSL. Volebni program 1996 (KDU-CSL. Election Programme 1996).
24 Alternativa pro nasi zemi. Program schvaleny XXXVIII. Sjezdem CSSD (Alternative for Our 
Country. Programme, adopted by the XXXVIII. Congress of the CSSD). 15.3.1997.
25 Pro demokratickou Evropu (Manifest KSCM) 1996. (For a Democratic Europe. Manifest 




























































































The coalition agreement of 1996 stressed the need to preserve Czech 
national interests and integrate the country into NATO and the EU. Again it did 
not include any specific preference as to the form of the integration process but 
merely stressed that the Czech Republic would accept the EU such as it would 
be at the moment of Czech accession.26
Whereas most of the political parties maintained their positions 
throughout the years, the two smaller coalition partners moved in favour of a 
‘Euro-optimist’ position. Several explanations are available: First, neither of the 
smaller coalition parties, their weaknesses notwithstanding, created a leadership 
structure comparable to that of the ODS. The dominant position of Vaclav Klaus 
blocked any substantial debate within the ODS and, in the early years of his 
government, within the coalition. The smaller parties, however, preserved more 
open and flexible internal structures which enabled them to absorb the growing 
direct experience of EU policymaking. This effectively corrected their originally 
more or less reserved position.
Second, both parties, as junior partners of the dominant ODS, quickly 
experienced the limits of their influence on government policymaking. 
Cultivating the European dimension of their policy, they were trying to increase 
their international recognition and widen their field of manoeuvre within the 
coalition. They succeeded only partly and in the context of an approaching 
crisis of government in 1997.
Third, the ODA being very similar to the ODS (even in its name), needed 
to obtain a more specific policy profile. A European policy, distinct from the 
position of the ODS, seemed to be a major opportunity, however, it was only 
partly successful. In fact, the public did not care much about the foreign policy 
differences within the coalition. Moreover, it instinctively favoured the position 
of the self-assured and assertive Prime Minister both vis-a-vis the EU and 
Germany.
1.4 DICHOTOMY OF THE CZECH INTEGRATION POLICY
The image of Czech integration policy in the period 1993-1996 was rather 
mixed. As mentioned above, the policy was shaped by sharp turns towards 
political realism and narrow understanding of national interests at the core of the 
government’s foreign policy concept.27 Moreover, this self-confident Czech
26 Preambule koalicni dohody mezi ODS, ODA a KDU-CSL (Preamble of the ODS, ODA and 
KDU-CSL Coalition Agreement), Mlada Fronta Dnes, 26.6.96, p.4.
27 See: Pavel Seifter, Vladimir Handl: Die Sicherheitspolitik der Tschechischen Republik. In: 
A.Pradetto (Hrsg): Ostmitteleuropa, Russland und die Osterweiterung der NATO. 




























































































policy was “insulted” by the fact that it had to negotiate a new Euro-Agreement 
in 1993 (signed on 4. October 1993, in force since 1.February 1995). First, it 
hoped to “inherit” the “Czechoslovak” Europe Agreement but was disappointed 
by the refusal of the EC to follow that route.28 Even more important, it was 
afraid that the new suspension clause (Art. 117/2 - which was not a part of the 
original Europe Agreement of December 1991) could classify the Czech 
Republic in a different category to that of Poland and Hungary.29
Institutions
The institutional set up was shaped by the process of association to the EU.30 
The joint institutions, established in order to implement the Association 
Agreement and monitor the process produced additional motivation for the 
Czech side to improve its national institution set-up related to the association 
process. The joint institutions consisted of the Association Council composed of 
representatives of Czech government, the Council of Ministers and European 
Commission. The Association Council exercises general guidance of the process 
of implementation of the Association agreement. The Association Committee, 
the executive body, supervised in a more practical way the association process 
and directed the activities of twelve subcommittees, which dealt with individual 
sectors and areas. The Parliamentary Association Committee comprises 
members of the Czech Parliament and of the European Parliament.
In preparation for implementation of the Association Agreement, the 
Czech Republic created four bodies. The Governmental Committee for 
European Integration was composed of individual ministers and headed by the 
Prime Minister. The Governmental Committee was charged both with strategic 
co-ordination and guidance of Czech relations with the EU and the 
implementation of the association process. The executive powers lay with the 
Working Committee for Implementation of the Association Agreement, headed
Sicherheit. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Vrlg., 1997), p.52.
28 Vaclav Klaus hoped that European Agreement could be simply transferred on both 
republics and
referred to private talks of John Major and Helmut Kohl on this matter. See Premier Vaclav 
Klaus in an interview for Mlada Fronta Dnes, 7.9.1992.
29 See e.g. interview of Deputy Minister of FA, Pavel Bratinka (ODA) for Mlada Fronta 
Dnes, 15.3. 1993. In: Zahranicni Politika Ceske Republiky. Dokumenty. Ministerstvo 
zahranici Ceske Republiky. (Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic. Documents. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), Prague: 3/1993 (further only Dokumenty), p.233.
30 for an analysis of Czech institutions in charge of integration policy see V.Smejkal, 
European Policy-Making in the Czech Republic - Institutional And Political Framework’, in 
B.Lippert, P.Becker (eds) Towards EU-Membership. Transformation and Integration in 




























































































by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and composed of higher 
governmental officials of individual ministries and government agencies. The 
Working Committee was assisted by twenty two working groups, charged with 
the implementation of the Association Agreement in individual areas and 
sectors. The working groups were supervised by government institutions 
competent in the respective areas. In addition to that, in early 1995 all ministries 
and other government agencies established a special EU-department or EU- 
section with more than one department. Some of the government agencies 
created also their multi-departmental working committees. The co-ordinating 
role lies with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, however, has only 
gradually adjusted its structure to the inevitable increase of its tasks. In mid 
1990 it was still just an under-staffed EC-Department, which was in charge of 
the co-ordination.
There was no special committee for integration within the Czech 
Parliament and the relevant issues were dealt with by the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs. The Office of the President played a prominent role in development of 
top-level relations with the EC and its individual member states. It influenced 
the general political debate on European integration and Czech national interest 
in this respect. Institutionally, however, it did not directly participate in the 
activities of the above mentioned government bodies and exercised rather an 
indirect influence on the Czech integration policy.
Impact of the Implementation Process
The limited liberalisation of Czech exports to the EU in “sensitive goods” and 
several anti-dumping cases against Czech steel and cement producers, among 
other critical issues, seemed to confirm the reserved position of centre-right 
government in Prague vis-à-vis the EU as a whole. Optimistic expectations by 
Czech representatives as far as the timing of Czech accession to the EU was 
concerned may be understood as an expression of their high self-esteem and 
interest in accessing the Single Market rather than the EU as such.31
However, a dichotomy soon developed in Czech policy, which gradually 
increased and which only receded in mid 1997 when the self-confidence of the
31 Premier Klaus assumed that the Czech Republic could become member of EC within 
approximately 5 years in interview for Hospodarske noviny on 6.11.1992; during signature of 
the free-trade-zone agreement of Visegrad countries on Dez.21, 1992 Minister Dlouhy argued 
that 2 years could be enough for Czech Republic to be prepared for full membership in EC. 
See in Data'. 12/92, p.804; since the beginning of 1993 Czech representatives repeated 
frequently their assessment that Czech republic would be ready to join EC within two to three 




























































































ODS was shattered by the economic and subsequent government crisis. On the 
one hand, the Prime Minister and other Czech representatives repeatedly 
expressed their reservations as far as the Maastricht model of integration was 
concerned. They heavily influenced public opinion on those issues and made the 
Czech desire to join the EU look unconvincing.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), but also other 
institutions responsible for implementation of the Europe Agreement, focused 
increasingly on practical issues in their relations with the EU. They welcomed 
the introduction of structured relations and the White Book on the Internal 
Market. Minister Zieleniec repeatedly demanded further improvements in the 
structural dialogue, especially in the field of economic policy and the third pillar 
- which the EU states were only partly ready to meet.32
The structural dialogue of CSFP was found to be satisfactory.33 With 
associated (“shadow”) European correspondent established within the MFA and 
attached to the European correspondents network Czech diplomacy gained 
access to a new dimension of policymaking and experienced the multiple strains 
of multilateral diplomacy.34 Gradually, the position of the MFA came closer to 
the position of the President’s Office, which has cultivated a “Euro-optimist” 
approach.
The approximation o f laws proved to be one of the most complex and 
difficult tasks to fulfil. The Czechoslovak government decided unilaterally to 
approximate national law to EU standards as early as 1991. The performance of 
the government 1992-1996, however, was influenced by a low respect for law in 
general, by prioritising economic aspects of the transformation process, by a 
lack of qualified and well paid civil servants, by attempts to avoid probable 
economic and social implications by postponing the implementation of EU 
norms in national economic and environmental policy.35 In the Czech Republic 
the process of legal approximation has a very good theoretical basis, a private
32 The introduction of the Schengen Agreement motivated further attempts of Czech policy to 
seek closer co-operation with the EU in this area. It considered obtaining a status, comparable 
with the status of Norway and Island as an eventual interim solution. Marketa Kronerova: 
Schengenska dohoda - cile a budoucnost. (Schengen Agreement - its Goals and Future), 
Mezinarodni politika: 2/1997, p.24.
33 Marga Jennewein, Kristina Larischova: Czech Republic, op.cit., p.72.
34 A responsible Czech official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed to the author that 
at least the initial phase of implementation of direct co-operation with the CFSP brought also 
considerable stress. In some cases the Czech diplomacy had to take in very short time 
positions on issues on which it would have no position at all.
5 Petr Desny: The Harmonisation of the Legislation of the Czech Republic with European 




























































































Legal Consortium over the implementation of the PHARE legal approximation 
giving methodological support to government institutions. The general 
institutional framework (Department of Compatibility with EU Law within the 
Ministry of Justice, previously situated within the Office for Legislation and 
Public Administration) is however insufficiently staffed and can only partially 
cope with the monumental task of approximation. Even the government’s 
Memorandum of July 1996, which declared the approximation to one of the 
government’s top priorities (with the aim of completing the process by the end 
of 1997!), did not change the general approach to the task. A real change 
required “an intellectual revolution”, which would make the government 
consider the law and stabilisation of the Czech civil service as just as important 
as for example privatisation.36
All in all, the general trend was, that in the course of implementation of 
the Europe Agreement and intensification of the institutionalised dialogue, the 
Czech government gradually accepted the Maastricht treaty and attached 
protocols as a reference point for its policymaking. Within the MFA there was a 
strong conviction, the reservations of some Czech politicians notwithstanding, 
that there was no question that Czech policy would not “digest” the Maastricht 
treaty and other norms of the EU in due time.37 The government sought, 
however, a self-confident position. The time to present the application 
(23.1.1996) was the best manifestation of it: in December 1995 the Czech 
Republic became the first post-Communist state member of the OECD. The 
Memorandum, attached to the EU application, reflected the ambivalent standing 
of the government with regards to the EU. On the one hand it acknowledged 
that the European Communities “guaranteed .... peace, stability, positive 
international relations, unparalleled freedom and economic prosperity”.38 It 
declared the readiness of the Czech Republic to “assume its adequate share of 
responsibility” for their further strengthening and development, to “exchange a 
part of its national sovereignty for a shared supranational sovereignty” and even 
referred twice to “solidarity” (a word black-listed among many Czech liberals) 
as an element of the construction of Europe. At the same time the Memorandum 
reflected the reservations of Czech neo-liberals by referring to the perceived 
“difficulties and shortcomings” of the EC. It stressed Czech devotion to 
“liberalisation of economic activities” and only in passing mentioned that the 
Czech republic “accepts broader, non-economic aspects of European 
integration.” The Czech Memorandum clearly represented a balancing act. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which drafted the Memorandum, was aware of the
36 Ibid., pp.51-54.
37 Conversation of the author with Ambassador Kreuter, Head of the Czech Mission to the EU 
in May 1994.




























































































fact, that the Premier’s criticism of the EU was often not competent and mostly 
contraproductive. The Memorandum represents a bridge between the 
’’eurosceptic” position of Vaclav Klaus and Euro-optimistic position of a state 
which wishes to become a member of the EU.39 As if to compensate for the 
conciliatory tone of the Memorandum the Prime Minister stressed that 
membership of the EU “creates a general framework, which allows different 
approaches towards the modalities contained in the European integration process 
itself.”40 In Davos (4.2.1996) he argued that a postponement of EMU would be a 
tragedy only for those politicians who put too much into the project. His 
comment was a rejection of EMU itself and at the same time an assault to 
Helmut Kohl’s vision of Europe.41 Later Vaclav Klaus warned Czech citizens 
that a substantial portion of tax revenues would be redirected to Brussels when 
EMU was implemented. He warned that membership of the EU involved a 
considerable loss of sovereignty and linked this issue to the question of German 
influence in Europe.42 At that stage of policy development Vaclav Klaus, 
however, did not gain full support for his criticism within the coalition any 
more and certainly not within the opposition CSSD. It is a paradox of the Czech 
political development that his criticisms of the EU met with full understanding 
within only the KSCM and the Republican party.
The achievements and shortcomings in implementation of the Europe 
Agreement clearly reflected the situation. Even where the Czech Republic was 
to gain, the policymakers and administrative structure were only partly co­
operative. Some Czech representatives argued, that the Czech Republic would 
not need EU structural funds contributions. The slogan that the Czech Republic 
needs “trade instead of aid”, reflected Czech behaviour throughout the first half 
of 1990. Arguing that the Czech Republic was ahead of many EU states in 
economic development, Vaclav Klaus suggested that EU money “would be
39 Conversation of the author with a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
February 1996. The official mentioned, that the government perceived the text of the 
Memorandum as nearly ''Euro-optimist".
40 quoted from Josef Vesely: The Fifteen EU Member States and the Associated Countries 
Have the Most Difficult of the Marathon Run Ahead. In: Czech Panorama, (Prague 1996),
r 37-1 End of January and early February 1996 was the time of the deepest resentment between 
the Czech Republic and Germany since 1989. Klaus Kinkel on 12.1. 1996 tried to revive the 
already agreed text of the bilateral declaration on reconciliation. The negotiations broke down 
wit both sides considering usefulness of their further continuation. The negotiations were 
renewed eventually on 12.2.1996, not least because of the position of the USA and France.
42 Vaclav Klaus: Podivna demagogicka aktivita CSSD. Cesko - nemecke vztahy: Vlada jedna 
rozhodne a zodpovedne, bez ohledu na stvanl extremism z obou zemf (Strange Demagogic 
Activity of the CSSD. Czech-German relations: The government Acts in a Decisive and 
Responsible Way, With No Regard to Hampering Activities of Extremist Forces on the Both 




























































































better spent in Portugal, Spain or even Italy”.43 This opinion, an expression of 
the neo-liberal rejection of the redistribution processes inherent to the EU, finds 
its supporters within the ODS to the present day. Some experts argue, there was 
even a lack of urgent interest and administrative effort in using the PHARE 
programme. In early 1997, the Representation of the European Commission 
criticised the Czech Republic (or more precisely, the co-ordinating body - the 
Ministry of Finance, Centre for Foreign Aid) that it faded to conclude contracts 
for 66% of the PHARE financial means reserved for the Czech Republic. Later 
the PHARE assistance for the regions devastated by the catastrophic floods in 
July 1997 was at least at an early stage processed slower than in Poland. Some 
elements of foreign aid (from Germany) avadable was redirected to Poland as 
the Czech administration was not able to make use of it fast enough.44 
According to Jan Kavan, since 1998 Minister of Foreign Affairs of CSSD 
government, up to 50% of the of the funding, offered to the Czech Republic in 
1990-1996 was not used.45
II. THE TURBULENT YEAR OF 1997
2.1 GENERAL REFLECTION
After the general elections in June 1996, the centre-right coalition created a 
minority government (it gained only 99 seats of 200 seats of the Chamber of 
Deputies). In 1997 it increased its number of seats to 100, while the opposition 
parties lost their majority and held 99 seats.46 The first ever Senate elections 
(November 1996) established a majority of the coalition parties.47 At the same 
time, they confirmed the position of the CSSD (30,8% of votes, 25 seats) as a 
second most important political party. In mid 1997, the monetary and economic 
crisis erupted. It was followed by political crisis leading finally to resignation of
43 The Financial Times, 2.8.1995. As quoted in: Anneke Hudalla, Der Beitrin der
Tschechischen Repubik..., p.122.
44 Nonetheless, the contribution of the EU is crucial. In November 1997 the European 
Investment Bank provided the Czech Republic with a long-term loan of 200 mill ECU as an 
assistance for the areas damaged by the floods in 1997 and for prevention of further 
catastrophes.
45 quoted in Petr Pavlik's Country Report Czech Republic. In: Enlargement/Agenda 2000- 
Watch. Pilot Issue. Ed. by Institute for Europaische Politik at all. (Bonn, October 
1998),pp.68-69,71.
46 One independent deputy refused to vote along any of the party lines. For election history of 
Czech Republic 1990-1997 see: F.Tumovec, New Electoral History o f the Czech Republic. 
Discussion paper 8/1998, April 1998, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, 
Charles University, Prague, here p.44.
47 The ODS won with 35,8% of votes (29 seats), the KDU-CSL gained 16,5% (13 seats), the 




























































































the Klaus government in November 1997. The immediate cause was unclear 
financing of the ODS, which motivated two junior coalition partners (ODA and 
KDU-CSL) to leave the coalition. As the move was made during Vaclav Klaus’ 
visit to Sarajevo, a new ’’Sarajevo assassination” became the catch-phrase - and 
a pretext for the ODS to present the ’’betrayal” as the true reason for the 
government crisis.
The dichotomy of Czech integration policy receded and practical 
integration policy was intensified in 1997. Falling behind became the issue both 
at home as well as in the EU.
One of the rather embarrassing experiences of Czech political 
development became further ideological polarisation. There are inevitably very 
different explanations of the crisis of Czech economic development in 1997. 
Looking back at the second half of the 90s, Vaclav Klaus sees the roots of 
economic decline in the year 1996. It was a “result of corrections of exterior 
economic disequilibrium that we had little control over”. The second reason was 
the restrictive monetary policy of the Central Bank.48
The expert community is divided on the question whether the concept of 
the reform, based on the so called “Washington consensus” and therefore much 
prized by the IMF and World Bank, was wrong from its initiation or whether it 
had been adequate but should have been adjusted by the mid 90s.49 The Social 
Democrats see the unsuccessful privatisation as the biggest mistake. The 
changes in both company and business regulation were too slow, liberalisation 
too fast and too naive and only in this context the exaggeratedly restrictive 
currency and monetary policy played a negative role.50 On the most general 
level the CSSD points out at disbalance between the development of domestic 
demand and the slow growth of the GDP. As a result the difference was filled 
up by growing external disparity - growing imports, slower growth of exports 
and therefore passive balance of foreign exchange. The tension between 
economic growth and external balance was caused by a wrong strategy of 
transformation as a whole. The liberalisation of foreign trade was asymmetrical 
and advantageous for more competitive foreign producers. The domestic
48 Vaclav Klaus quoted in Economy nearing depression, Hospodarske noviny, 23.3.1999. 
More detailed presentation of the same agruments: V Klaus, Zeme, kdes se jiz dva roky 
nevladne, (The Country Where Nobody Governs For Two Years Already) (Praha, CEP, 1999)
49 For illustration of the independent expert debate see M.Pick Od zacatku na falesne ceste 
(From the Start on a Wrong Path), and P.Zahradnik Start reformy byl dobry (The Start of the 
Reform Was Correct), both in Hospodarske noviny 1.4.1999, p .ll .
50 Presentation of deputy Prime Minister of the social democratic government Mladek, quoted 





























































































producers were, moreover, disantvantaged by deliberate government abstention 
from any noteworthy microeconomic policy, by failed privatisation and the 
inability of the government to create a solid legal and institutional framework 
for market economy. The low exchange rate of 1990 may have helped exports of 
less sophisticated production. State support for more sophisticated production 
and exports was, however, insufficient.51
The Klaus governments pursued an economic policy liberal as to its 
intentions but less so as to measures. The role of the state was indeed minimal, 
the state did not develop any sizeable industrial policy (even if Minister Dlouhy 
argued from 1996 there was an industrial policy in place), refused to formulate 
and implement a structural economic reform, as demanded by some academics, 
the business community and the political opposition. At the same time, it did not 
implement even the traditional liberal agenda as regards the institutional and 
legislative framework of economic development. The liberal government did not 
produce prudent legal norms nor did it establish controlling institutions, which 
would implement strict rules. The feud-tainted financial markets lost domestic 
and international confidence and could not provide the economy with sufficient 
credits needed for restructuring.52 The financial market, intransparent and barely 
regulated, represent a good example of the government’s approach: it took the 
government five years to acknowledge the necessity of standard control 
mechanisms, normal in the most liberal economies, but deliberately ignored in 
the Czech liberal concept. Some of the liberal politicians reportedly even 
argued, that a capital market itself was not necessary: allegedly, the real 
objective was a concentration of the property, dispersed by the voucher 
privatisation.53
The mass privatisation to a large extent failed to establish clear ownership 
relations. The vouchers were exchanged for shares concentrated in privatisation 
funds, linked with banks, the major shareholder of which was the State itself. 
The result was an absence of structural changes, a prevailing continuity of 
management, involved too often in ’’tunnelling” (defrauding the companies) and 
a concentration of economic power in the hands of a very small group of people.
51 For this and further in-depth analysis for the point of view of the CSSD see: Zprava vlady o 
stavu ceske spolecnosti (Governments Report on the State of Czech Society), Hospodarske 
noviny 5.3.1999.
52 C.Konecny, Czech Adjustments to the European Union - the Socio-Economic Setting, in 
B.Lippert, P.Becker Towards EU-Membership...., p. 68.
53 reference made in critical reflection on the 'liberal' concept by L.Mlcoch Trh potrebuje 





























































































The CSSD argued that the privatisation method had catastrophic 
implications for the national economy. That is arguably demonstrated by the 
fact, that the lead of the state owned enterprises in added value per capita of the 
labour force over Czech privatised companies even increased from 1996. The 
undisputed leadership is with the foreign owned companies. Nonetheless, at the 
same time foreign capital participation in the privatisation process was largely 
restricted under Klaus government.
Other views, however, oppose such a critical assessment as too radical 
and general. The Klaus governments, according to this views, did more or less 
what could have been expected from a post-communist government. The 
outcome of the policy should be measured by long term indicators of growth and 
compared with the neighbouring East Central European countries, looking not 
only at 90s, but at the 80s as well. From this vintage point the preliminary 
results of the Czech economic transformation may be contradictory but not 
totally unsuccessful. The later CSSD policy did no, after all, offer any radical 
alternative to the liberal attitude.54
In any case, with the attempts to maintain the exchange rate at the level of 
1990, the Czech Koruna experienced real appreciation which further 
undermined the competitiveness of Czech enterprises on both foreign and 
domestic markets. The trade balance deteriorated to an unsustainable degree, 
provoked a currency crisis in May 1997 and led the CNB to prefer a managed 
floating of the Koruna.55 The two “packages” of austerity measures, adopted by 
the government of Vaclav Klaus in April and June 1997 concentrated on fiscal 
and monetary tools. As a result, on the one hand, the current account deficit was 
reduced. On the other, however, GDP growth virtually stopped.
Foreign experts indicated as early as 1995 that the major problem of the 
Czech economy constituted insufficient competitiveness by Czech suppliers, 
insufficient equity capitalisation of domestic firms and a complicated ownership 
structure of many privatised companies the profits of which might be channelled 
towards consumption rather than investment.56 The poor financial infrastructure 
of Czech banks involved in the privatisation, and overburden by bad loans (thus
54 So the Czech representative to the IMF, Jiri Jonas in his Svetova ekonomika na prelomu 
tisicileti (World Economy at the Turn of the Century) (Praha: Management Press, 2000), pp. 
9-54.
55 J.Poschl Czech Republic: Medium- and Long-term Economic Prospects. Vienna, March 
1999 (manuscript), here p.14.
56 See J.Poschel in V.Handl. C.Konecny, J.Poschl, Czech Republic, in W.Weidenfeld (ed.) 
Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union. (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann 




























































































postponing bankruptcy and the restructuring of huge private firms - like Skoda 
Plzen or Chemapol - and state-owned companies), rather hampered than 
facilitated the long term investment in restructuring and technology 
modernisation.
2.2 FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVATION
Against the background of a mounting crisis, it was not obvious that the 
government’s foreign and integration policy gained new momentum. 
Apparently, the critical situation confirmed the closeness of the transformation 
agenda and preparation for membership in the EU. Also, the individualist accent 
of Czech foreign policy proved to be inadequate: a more co-operative approach 
in bilateral as well as multilateral policy improved rather than burdened Czech 
position in international affairs.
In Czech foreign policy further important shifts took place during 1997. 
The accession to NATO became a matter of prime importance and drew 
attention to the Czech policy debate within the public, mass media and political 
elite. As in other areas, a closer look at the results of Czech policy confirmed 
what experts had long pointed out: the government, with exception of its 
diplomatic effort, had prepared for the NATO membership very slowly, the 
security and defence policy being underestimated or neglected.57 The question of 
ability to access the other integrated institution - the EU - was obvious and 
started to bother the public and political elite.
After more than three years Czech-Slovak consultations at a high level 
were resumed with Vaclav Klaus’ visit to Piestany (Slovakia) in October 1997. 
Both Prime Ministers decided to proceed with negotiations on a mutual 
exchange of shares in Komercm banka and Vseobecna uverova banka and on the 
question of Slovak gold being held by CNB, the Czech Central Bank. Also, it 
was agreed that the so-called commission for the division of property of the 
former Czechoslovakia, which had been inactive since the spring of 1993 should 
resume its activity and resolve the mutually recognised claims. Both sides 
wished to preserve the customs union.58 Czech governments have always 
expressed their support of Slovak membership of both the EU and NATO. 
Given the controversial standing of the Slovak side on both issues the Czech
57 See the continuous effort i.a. of the Institute of International Relations, Prague, to draw 
attention to the obvious absence of a coherent concept of Czech security and defence policy. 
In: The Security Policy o f the Czech Republic. HR Research Project, Prague 1994, followed 
by The Security Policy o f the Czech Republic. IIR, Prague 1997. Both reports edited by 
Dr.Jaroslav Janda and Dr. Jan Eichler.
58 Klaus a Meciar se shodli vice, nez sami predem ohlasovali. (Klaus and Meciar Agreed 




























































































government did not however see it possible to co-ordinate Czech and Slovak 
policies in this respect.
The trend of deepening regional co-operation received a new momentum 
in 1997. The invitation by NATO and the EU to start negotiations concerning 
accession with three of the Visegrad states opened a new chapter in Czech co­
operation with its neighbouring countries.59 Within “Visegrad Four” a smaller 
“Visegrad Three” came into being. Jaroslav Sedivy, the new Czech Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (appointed by Premier Klaus in November 1997, after Minister 
Zieleniec had resigned) addressed Poland and Hungary as the closest partners of 
the Czech Republic and let Hungarian Minister Lazslo Kovacs, ’’doyen” of the 
group, speak as a representative of all three states. The three agreed to co­
ordinate during the process of integration into NATO and the EU. As the Euro- 
sceptical touch of Czech policy faded away in the last months of the Vaclav 
Klaus government and was fully rejected by the government of Josef Tosovsky, 
the overall framework of Czech-German relations improved. Minister Sedivy 
skilfully bridged the sceptical approach of his predecessor with regards to the 
OSCE, a forthcoming approach to regional co-operation was welcomed in Bonn. 
The Czech-German Fund for the Future, founded in January 1998 was designed 
to address the victims of Nazism and the Czech-German Forum was to provide a 
basis for broad social discourse about the past and future of Czech-German 
relations.
2.3 INTEGRATION POLICY FROM DICHOTOMY TO 
DISTRACTED ACTION
Institutions
The issue of the effectivity of the institutional set up of Czech integration policy 
has been debated ever since the end of 1994 when the Governmental Committee 
for European Integration was established. One of the possible options - the 
establishment of a European Ministry - became an object of considerations for 
some time. It was among other things an increasingly difficult balance of power 
within the governing coalition which, however, prevented the government from 
taking this step: every coalition party would have claimed the new ministerial 
post for itself. The idea of a Euro-ministry reappeared during negotiations about 
the creation of a care-taker government in December 1997. The limited mandate 
and time table of the government was, however, one of the reasons for a further 
postponement of further deliberations in this respect.
59 Like in the case of Portugal and Spain, it was the gradual integration which provided for 




























































































Throughout the years, the activity of the government Committee has been 
perceived as being not particularly efficient in directing the efforts of the 
implementation process. It has not exercised any noteworthy strategic guidance 
of governmental integration policy.60 Most of its work-load has rested upon the 
Working Committee for Implementation of the Europe Agreement which was 
renamed the Working Committee for European Integration, headed by the 
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in charge of European Integration.61 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs enhanced its structures dealing with the integration 
issues: in mid 1997 the EC-Department was divided into two separate 
departments: the Department for Political Relations with EU (OPEU) and the 
Department for Co-ordination of Relations with EU dealing with the first and 
third pillar issues (OKEU). Both departments are elements of an Section for 
Integration of the Ministry, which includes also Security Policy Department and 
United Nations Department.
In early 1997 the need to elaborate on a negotiation position and the 
establishment of a negotiating team became urgent. The necessity to have a 
relatively large number off experts has been acknowledged since 1994. It was 
one of the clear messages, which Austrian politicians stressed vis-à-vis their 
Czech partners (on official State- as well as unofficial party-level) after 
negotiating the Austrian EU-accession. Only in February 1997 did the Vice 
Minister of FA Svoboda address the issue in practical terms. He expected the 
bulk of the team to consist of the Working Committee. The prominent problem 
turned out to be the level of language skills combined with expert knowledge in 
individual areas. It was common knowledge that the potential of the government 
after having done next to nothing in this area was extremely limited and could 
have hampered the result of the negotiations on EU accession.
It again reveals the fact, that reform of the Civil Service had not been a 
priority of the Czech government upon that point. The extremely small group of 
available public servants with limited knowledge of the EU matters could only 
partly fulfil the complex task: to play the role of a “transmitter” between the 
EU and the Czech Republic, be instrumental in implementation of the European 
Agreement, prepare the Czech Republic for admission into the EU, represent its 
interests vis-à-vis the EU, “educate” both the political elite and public opinion 
about the EU and explain the potential risks and opportunities of Czech 
membership.
60 For an analysis of the Czech and Czech-European set up of institutions in the case of law 
approximation see: Desny, The Harmonisation of the Legislation .... p.52.




























































































In the Chamber of Deputies, the growing weight of the opposition CSSD 
meant also its increasingly articulated criticism of the Premier’s vision of the 
EU and of the slow pace of government integration policy as a whole. Also, the 
newly elected Senate offered new opportunities for public scrutiny of the 
government’s European policy. The Senate Committee for Constitutional Law, 
headed by social-democrat Rychetsky proved to be most active in this respect.
Gradual Adjustment of Integration Policy
The partial loss of self-confidence by the Czech government after the elections 
of June 1996 helped to free the policy of integration from its ideological 
overtones. At the same time competition between the government and the 
opposition was growing and the gap within the coalition widening. Both 
processes took place against the background of a deteriorating economic 
situation. The government, lacking a clear concept, political focus and 
increasingly also leadership was not able to follow a policy of concerted action 
in dealing with integration issues. Its effort remained distracted.
Earlier Czech policy was most active within the structured dialogue on 
CSFP -  not an ideal but, in any case, the best functioning part of structured 
relations as a whole. It readily supported the common positions of the EU and 
even stepped up its participation in the IFOR/SFOR operations under the 
leadership of NATO. The Avis of the European Commission of July 1997 found 
that the Czech government confirmed its readiness to participate fully and 
actively in the CFSP. The European Commission expected the Czech Republic 
to become an effective member of the CFSP and to fulfil its obligations in this 
field. Indeed, the Czech Republic was in fact, like most of the other associated 
countries, ready to go further than the CSFP framework offered. Moreover, 
Czech foreign policy took seriously the message that the EU would not open the 
doors to new members if they had unsolved disputes with their neighbours, or if 
they kept their doors closed to each other.
Czech policy gradually moved towards a co-operative approach even in 
those areas, where the redistributive elements were obviously in conflict with 
neo-liberal convictions. In February 1997 during the visit of EU-Commissioner 
Flynn, Minister for Labour and Social Affairs Vodicka (ODS) for the first time 
publicly recognised that the Social Charter of the EU was a constituent part of 
the acquis communautaire. The Czech Republic would accept, according to his 
view, the establishment of work councils in individual enterprises in accordance 
with the Maastricht treaty.62
62 He repeated this position during the session of corresponding ministers of the EU and 




























































































Indeed, the EU played a twofold role in this respect. On the one hand, 
where it praised the Czech transformation or simply observed diplomatic 
politeness, an additional layer of legitimisation was the result even if it was of 
secondary importance to the government. Even if the sessions of the Association 
Council as a rule raised some of the trade issues and approximation of laws, the 
overall impression reflected in the media was generally positive.
On the other hand, whenever Commission officials criticised Czech 
policymaking they added to the legitimacy of expert and political opposition to 
the self-confident and “no-altemative” course of the ODS - both within and 
outside of the coalition. In October 1996 Commissioner Wulf Mathies defended 
the social dimension of the integration process. In December 1996 Hans van den 
Broek presented to Czech parliamentarians a list of urgent tasks for the Czech 
Republic to fulfil prior to EU membership. Leon Britain’s visit to Prague 
(March 1997) once again pointed to the urgent need to put through reforms of 
the state administration, implement structural changes in industry, step up the 
fight against corruption, stabilise the finance sector and speed up the process of 
approximation of laws. In order to assist the Czech Republic to decrease a 
constantly growing negative trade balance, the EC offered 4 mil ECU from the 
PHARE programme in support of Czech exports to the EU.
The growing crisis in the Czech economy made the Czech style of 
policymaking more open. Premier Klaus visited the EU in April 1997 in order to 
discuss a package of austerity measures with the European Commission. He 
obviously sought consent for his economic plans and, very probably, additional 
domestic legitimisation for the measures. He also wished to prevent possible 
tension with the EU in view of import deposits which the government planned to 
introduce in order to decrease the trade deficit with the EU. The European 
Commission, however, perceived the import deposits as being in conflict with 
the Europe Agreement, Art. 65. and it did not agree that the Czech Republic was 
facing a trade balance crisis. To the contrary Vaclav Klaus held the Europe 
Agreement for being at least partly responsible for the Czech economic crisis.63
The Czech government Committee for Integration argued that with 
abolition of EU trade barriers the obstacles on the EU side concentrated 
increasingly in the sphere of mutual recognition of certificates, veterinary 
regulations and anti-dumping measures. The Committee however did not take 
any restrictive measures against EU exports.
(Czech Republic Declares its Support for the Social Dialogue). Ceske Noviny (CTK), 
7.10.1997
63 A.Robinson, R.Anderson: Czech Premier attacks EU association agreements: Klaus says 




























































































The question of trade deposits clearly demonstrated the lack of Czech 
government’s competence in dealing with a huge and growing trade deficit. 
After much resentment in its relations with the EU the government abolished the 
deposits requirement in August 1997 as they did not generate any positive 
economic effect. 64 The case showed a lack of experience and “know how” of 
the government in dealing with the conflicts of economic interests between the 
Czech Republic and the EU. Also, they proved a readiness on the Czech part to 
risk a conflict with the European Commission. The dispute over trade issues was 
to be followed by the Tosovsky government in 1998 as well.
Precisely the real disputes between the Czech government and the EU 
revealed the peculiar character of the Czech position in Brussels. Critics of 
Vaclav Klaus’s political style were getting stronger even within the coalition. 
During the Session of the joint Parliamentary Association Committee of the EP 
and the Czech Parliament (June 1997) the Czech co-chairman, Daniel Kroupa 
(ODA), criticised Premier Klaus for his irresponsible remarks vis-a-vis EU 
institutions, as his criticism would aggravate Czech opportunities to access the 
EU. Later he argued that Vaclav Klaus should give up his chairmanship of the 
government Committee for Integration because of his “Euro-sceptic” positions 
and proposed establishment of a Ministry for European Integration.
Also, the Czech approach to structural policy of the EU and to financial 
aid was gradually changing. It was, however, only the Tosovsky government, 
which took a positive approach to the structural funds. The delimitation of the 
EU funds for associated countries was clearly welcomed. In fact PHARE helped 
among other things to finance the professional training of a number of Czech 
officials and co-funded the programmes on the approximation of laws. The 
funding of the cross-border regional co-operation between the Czech Republic 
and its immediate EU neighbours - Germany and Austria and other associated 
countries, though mainly Poland, became extremely important.65
64 So, the Director General of the Association of Czech Industry and Transport, Bretislav 
Ostadal, asked for fast and quiet abolishment of the deposit as they did not have any real 
effect. Banks did not collect the deposits anyway, they only encashed the interest rates from 
loans, which they provided for them. See: Bratinka: MPO se v Bruselu nechovalo 
diplomaticky a efektivne (Bratinka: Ministry of industry and Trade Did not Act in Diplomatic 
and Effective Way). Ceske Noviny (CTK) , 30.5.1997.
65 Early 1998, there were eleven project of cross border co-operation between Poland and the 
Czech Republic. See: Program Evropske unie prispeje na spolecne cesko-polske projekty 





























































































It was apparently the economic crisis and public disillusionment in mid 
1997, combined with additional pressures "from outside” (the EU, the Council 
of Europe, NATO and individual partners) and with increasing opposition 
influence on policymaking through parliamentary bodies, which changed the 
general setting of Czech integration policy. The dichotomy of the Czech policy 
approach to integration was mostly overridden. At the same time, Premier Klaus 
maintained his critical opinion of the EU integration model. For example in 
September 1997 he praised CEFTA as an example of effective co-operation 
without excessive bureaucratisation, which involves the EU integration. 66 A 
more active integration policy had to count with growing domestic tension, a 
changing political landscape, and a need to concentrate on urgent tasks of 
economic stabilisation.
The government proceeded in legislative activity. It drafted for example a 
law on the residence of foreigners in the Czech Republic and an asylum law. 
Both drafts considerably tightened the conditions of residence and met one of 
the important conditions of EU admission. The condition of the Czech national 
administration, general situation in approximation of law, lack of structural 
changes in national economy and other problems turned out, however, to be the 
most important obstacles on the Czech road to the EU. The original impression 
that the Czech Republic was best prepared of associated states for EU 
integration, gradually receded.67 Indeed, the government stepped up its effort in 
the sphere of legislation, administrative reform and preparation for accession 
negotiations to the EU. It is the brief and final period of the government of 
Vaclav Klaus (spring-autumn 1997), which the care-taker government of Josef 
Tosovsky (January-June 1998) could point to and stress the aspect of continuity 
with most of all. Due to the former delays, the Klause’s agenda of preparation 
for EU membership was extremely full.68 The progress made was not so 
spectacular as in the sphere of foreign policy but it nevertheless took place.
The establishment of the Senate increased the influence of the opposition 
parties on the conduct of European policy. In May 1997, the Senate Committee 
for Constitutional Law criticised the legal approximation process and deemed it 
to be unsatisfactory. The Committee envisaged stronger control of the process.
66 See: Klaus srovnal nebyrokraticke seskupeni CEFTA s Evropskou unii (Klaus Compared 
the Non-bureaucratic Grouping of CEFTA to the EU). Ceske Noviny (CTK), 12.9.1997.
67 During his visit in January 1997 Klaus Hansch still thought the Czech Republic was most 
advanced in the preparation for EU membership. See in Pravo 20.1.1997.
68 See suggestions for preparation of Czech accession to the EU in Miloslav Had, Jaroslav 
Jaks, Cestmir Konecny: Ceska Republika a Evropska Unie. (The Czech Republic and the 
European Union). In: Vaclav Kotyk (ed) Ceska zahranicni politika. Uvahy o prioritach. 
(Czech Foreign Policy. Reflections on Priorities.) (Praha: Ustav mezinarodnich vztahu, 1997), 




























































































It found, that some ministries presented even such norms as compatible, which 
in fact conflicted in some parts with the acquis communautaire. Later the year 
Minister of Justice Parkanova acknowledged that individual ministries did not 
efficiently co-operate in the legislative process, there prevailed a sceptical 
approach vis-a-vis law experts, who were frequently excluded from final 
drafting of individual laws.69 In September 1997 the Ministry of Justice drafted 
adjustments to the Czech constitution which were considered necessary for the 
EU accession. Given the increasing levels of discrimination against the Czech 
Romany population and the pressures exerted by the EU and international 
community as a whole, the government pursued a more positive line of action. 
In October 1997 it issued a report on the situation and envisaged measures in the 
sphere of education and security.
Prague was confident enough to suggest the completion of the 
approximation of legislation on environmental matters by 1999. Indeed, the 
annual meeting of the environmental ministers of EU and associate countries 
(September 1997) regarded the Czech Republic and Estonia as the most 
advanced states in this single respect.
Also preparations to adjust the alien and migration laws were under way. 
At the same time the Czech Republic shared a deep interest with Poland in 
preventing any negative impact of new regulations on their relations with their 
eastern neighbours and partners.
In October 1997 The Chamber of Deputies passed a law on the creation of 
Higher Self-governing Local Units (regional administration) fulfilling at last the 
provisions of the Czech Constitution. It should improve the ability of the 
country to participate effectively in regional, cross-border co-operation and 
enable it to make use of the structural policy of the EU as soon as the 
membership in the EU will have been accomplished.
In mid 1997, at last, the government started to pay more attention to the 
financial sector in order to make the capital and financial markets more 
transparent, efficient and compatible with EU standards. Intensive efforts were 
made at the end of 1997/early 1998 to amend Czech banking legislation by 
separating investment banking and commercial banking activities and by 
enhancing the supervisory activities through the creation of a Securities 
Commission.
69 Podle Parkanove vznikaji nektere navrhy zakonu bez ucasti pravniku (According to 




























































































IV. THE CZECH POLICY SINCE 1998: BACK TO THE BASICS, 
FORWARD INTO THE EU-ACCESSION TALKS.
The Governor of the Czech National Bank, Josef Tosovsky, headed a caretaker 
government introduced on the last day of 1997. The government was supported 
by two former coalition parties ODA and KDU-CSL, and also by the Czech 
Social Democratic Party (CSSD). A small party called Union of Freedom (US) 
split from the ODS of Vaclav Klaus, and declared opposition to the government. 
The extraordinary election of the Chamber of Deputies in June 1998 resulted in 
victory for the CSSD (74 seats of 200 or 32,3% votes). Surprisingly the strong 
position of the ODS (63 seats, 27,7% of votes) and ideological differences 
between the CSSD and the small parties of the centre (KDU-CSL, ODA and 
US) prevented the establishment of a centre-left coalition. Eventually, the Social 
Democrats formed a minority government backed by a so-called ’’opposition 
agreement” signed with its biggest rival - the ODS, in which the latter agreed 
not to initiate or support a vote of no confidence against the government. 
Through the agreement, the ODS participated indirectly in some key elements of 
the government’s policy. The most positive result of the election was that the 
nationalist and racist oriented Republican Party SPR-RSC was not elected to the 
parliament.
The subsequent governments of Tosovsky and Zeman focused on 
amending the transformation strategy of the Czech Republic and on the 
implementation of a pre-accession strategy as parallel and partly identical 
processes. Czech policy arrived at a more coherent concept of integration policy. 
The problem, however, lay in its implementation. The weak position of both 
governments, the contraction of the national economy in 1997-1999, the heritage 
of the laissez-fair attitude of the conservative governments, as well as the mixed 
character record of the de-facto great coalition between the governing CSSD and 
opposition ODS caused a uneven intensification of preparation for EU 
membership.
4.1 GENERAL REFLECTION 
Changes to Political Landscape
Even if the political responsibility for economic and political turbulence might 
have seemed unequivocal, a number of experts from renowned domestic and 
international financial institutions hoped that a renewed conservative coalition 
lead by Vaclav Klaus could have won the elections.70 Nor did the public seem to





























































































locate responsibility with the ODS or Vaclav Klaus. The behaviour of the public 
(though increasingly demanding social responsibility by the State) resembled 
what sociologist Jiri Vecemik labelled a ’’thinking left - voting right” attitude.71 
Vaclav Klaus conducted his election campaign and subsequent opposition 
activities (he became the Speaker of the Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies) 
from the position of a successful leading government party, the only problem of 
which, allegedly, was betrayal within its own ranks and on the side of its 
coalition partners. He proved once again to be skilful in projecting a positive 
public image of the party. Publishing a dramatic ’’call for mobilisation” on the 
last day of the election campaign, the ODS succeeded in instrumentalising a 
resident anxiety of the public about ’’left experiments”.72 As a result, the 
difference between CSSD and ODS was just about 5%, and the parties of the 
former coalition could have theoretically formed a majority government, 
controlling 102 seats in Lower House.73
The arrangement between the CSSD and the ODS has been criticised by 
many commentators, other political parties and the President. An apprehension 
that this arrangement was not a ’’clean solution” as it might hamper any 
substantial reform moves, was wide-spread. Moreover, both parties were 
suspected of using a sort of ’’great coalition” arrangement (with 134 seats put 
together in the lower House they had a constitutional majority) in areas of 
common interest - such as their intention to amend election law, introducing 
elements of the majority election model in it. The two parties sought to establish 
a two party system and marginalize the smaller political actors. The ODS, in a 
favourable situation for an opposition party (Vaclav Klaus was elected on the 
basis of the ’’opposition agreement” as the President of the Chamber of 
Deputies) was expected to regain lost ground.
The position of the ODA further weakened. The KDU-CSL, ODA, US and 
a small right wing Demokraticka unie (DEU, Democratic Union) formed an 
election ’’coalition of four” in 1998, hoping to act against their degradation by 
the CSSD-ODS ’’opposition agreement”. The Communist party supported the 
Tosovsky government in principle and has gradually become more involved in 
Czech policymaking. The party originally conditioned its support of a CSSD 
minority government with a referendum on NATO membership. Later on, 
however, the Communists manifested political realism by voting in favour of the
71 See Preface of Jacques Rupnik to the Zprava o vyvoji ceske spolecnosti. 1989-1998. (Social 
Report on the Czech Republic in 1989-1998). Ed.Jiri Vecemik, Petr Mateju. (Praha: 
Academia, 1998) p.14.
12 The ODS mobilisation call flooded public places and had an appearance of a public 
mobilisation call, used for calling men to arms in case of an aggression against their 
homeland.




























































































state budget (January 1999), and by withdrawing their earlier demands for a 
(cosmetic) reduction of the military budget.74 Their support of the CSSD 
government was often essential for the implementation of the government’s 
policy.
The outcome of the local elections and by-elections to the Senate in 1998 
confirmed the tendency of a decreasing support for the CSSD in November 
1998. In local elections the ODS won 24.3%, the CSSD 17.6%, the KSCM 
13.6% and the KDU-CSL 10.6% of votes. The by-election to the Senate 
resulted in a bitter defeat for the ruling CSSD (which gained only 3 of 27 re­
elected seats), whereas the parties to the right of centre won 9 (ODS) and 13 
seats (the ’’coalition of four” centre-right parties).75
The ’’opposition agreement” was extended by several specific conditions 
and principles of co-operation into an ’’agreement of tolerance” in January 1999. 
The CSSD and the ODS agreed among other things on support for the state 
budget, legislative and other measures aimed at speeding up the course of 
preparation for the EU membership.
They negotiated their concept of electoral reform and pushed it through 
the parliament. Some political scientists interpreted the attempt as electoral 
engineering, which would result in the most disproportional and unique election 
system in comparison with the existing standard democracies.76 Moreover, the 
impression was growing strong that the ODS aimed at proposing establishing 
Vaclav Klaus as the new president with the support of the CSSD in 2002. 
President Havel refused to sign the respective law and the latter became subject 
to a Constitutional Court ruling in January 2001 which found the law in conflict 
with the constitutional stipulation about the proportional election system.
The public attitude showed growing disillusion. Both parties of the 
’’opposition agreement” began to lose public support. In 1999, the public even 
favoured the former ’’socialist” regime, rather than the post-1989 democratic 
system.77 A new public political initiative, IMPULS 99, declared the cultivation 
of democratic rule its priority.78 In November 2000, both the regular Senate by­
74 The reduction would have further burdened Czech delayed preparation for NATO 
membership.
75 The CSSD and the ODS thus have 23 and 26 seats respectively and therefore the three-fifth 
majority. The communists could double their representation in the Senate (four seats in total).
76 Michal Klima, Volebni eforma v Ceske republice v letech 1998-2000 (Election Reform in 
the Czech Republic 1998-2000), Politologicky casopis: 3/2000, p.241.
77 STEM: Cesi davaji prednost monunismu pred demokracii (STEM: Czechs Prefer 
Communism To Democracy), Lidove noviny, 5.10.1999, p.l
78 Tomas Halik, Nejde o ’’nepolitickou politku”, ale o demokracii (The Aim is Democracy 




























































































elections as well as the first ever elections to the local deputy assemblies of the 
new self-governing bodies testified the change of the constellation. The ODS 
and the CSSD failed to maintain their dominant positions in the Senate: the 
’’coalition of four” came out as the clear winner from the elections.79 Unlike the 
CSSD, the ODS was able to form or participate in local governments in most of 
the 14 regions. The CSSD suffered a humiliating defeat.80
While the political situation remained a source of pessimism, the 
economic growth of the year 2000 improved the atmosphere in the society. The 
Czech public expressed positive expectations regarding individual well being for 
the first time since 1996. The ’’revolution” of the employees of the Czech public 
TV in December 2000/January 2001 turned out into the most powerful public 
protest.81 Some analysts argued that elements of a civic society, which Vaclav 
Havel has advocated against Vaclav Klaus throughout the decade, has finally 
started to gain ground.82
A concerned view, however, emphasised the fast differentiation of Czech 
society. Unlike in 1998, when the CSSD and the ODS dominated the political 
spectrum (they recorded support of 36,5 and 34,3% of the public) their positions 
were weakened considerably by the end of 2000 (19% and 26,1% respectively). 
Instead, the support for the KSCM grew from 12,6% in 1998 to 21,4% in 
December 2000. The ’’coalition of four” received support of 33,5% in December 
2000. Consequently, four instead of two political subjects shaped the political 
constellation by the end of 2000. The change reflected two major developments: 
the increasing differentiation along the left/centre-right axis caused by growing 
social tension, and the sharp polarisation of public opinion. According to some 
views, the Czech political scene approached a stalemate and dangerous 
fragmentation. Such a development could impact very negatively on the Czech 
accession to the EU.83
79 It gained 63% of votes and 17 of the 27 of the newly elected seats in the Senate. The ODS 
received 7 new seats (30% of votes) and the CSSD only 1 seat (3,7% of votes.).
80 The clear winner of the election was the ODS with 185 seats, followed by the "coalition of 
four” with 171 seats in the local assemblies. The KSCM received 161 seats (but at the end 
represented the major looser as none of the other parties wanted to form a coalition with it; 
communists thus had to stay outside of the local governments) and the CSSD only 111 seats.
81 A majority of the staff of the public TV protested joined an occupation strike against a new 
leaderhip linked allegedly with the ODS and installed by a politically biased Czech Television 
Council. Under the pressure of the mass protests the Parliament had to dissolve the Czech 
Television Council, adopt a new law on public television and install an interim director of the 
CTV itself.
82 Jiri Pehe, Konci Havlova a Klausova era (Era of Havel and Klaus Coming to an End), 
Hospodarske noviny, 11.1.2001, p.6.





























































































The Tosovsky government focused on consolidation of the situation and on 
acceleration of substantial reforms in all key spheres of the national economy. 
Structural reform and further privatisation were not easy to implement given the 
previous negative experience of the population and the resulting lack of 
confidence in legality and transparency of the processes. The gap between the 
winners (private service sector) and the loosers (agriculture and heavy industry 
sectors) of the decade devoted to the transformation has been growing.84 At the 
same time it was acknowledged that without further preparation of the national 
economy on all levels, membership of the EU might result in a dramatic increase 
in unemployment and social tension.85 Indeed, the main priority for all applicant 
states has to be to the creation of adequate conditions for fast economic growth 
(largely through structural reforms) within a framework of macroeconomic 
stability.86
The situation of the CSSD minority government was critical in 1998. It 
had to ’’cope with the state’s first true recession and prepare for EU membership 
without a majority in parliament and with a suspicious bureaucracy and hostile 
media to contend with”87. Premier Zeman described the government with a 
melodramatic emphasis as a ’’cabinet of suiciders”. General continuity with the 
Tosovsky cabinet notwithstanding, some important differences soon became 
clear: the CSSD government concept presupposes an even more pronounced role 
for the state in microeconomic policy. There have been, however, internal 
differences within the CSSD itself. Deputy Prime Minister and Minster of 
Finance Mertlik on the liberal wing and the older generation have represented 
the younger generation by Minister of Industry and trade Gregr and Minister of 
Agriculture Fencl on a more traditional state interventionist wing. As a whole 
the CSSD government for the first time accepted a deficit in the state budget (up 
to 3%) as a support for economic growth. Back in 1998, low government 
spending was one of the important reasons for contracting domestic demand - a 
fact acknowledged by the European Commission.88 The CNB in fact
Forces), Hospodarske noviny, 7.2.2001, p.16.
84 Petr Pavlik, The Czech Republic, in: Helena Tang (ed), Winners and Loosers o f EU 
Integration. Policy Issues fo r Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
Bertelsmann Found., 2000) pp. 121 -143.
85 Tosovsky: Nynejsi deregulace cen jsou zcela legitimni (Tosovsky: Present Deregulation of 
Prices Fully Legitimate), Ceske Noviny (CTK), 26.3.1998.
86 See opinion of the EU Ambassador to Prague Johannes Ter Haar in: For Czechs, EU 
Application No Longer a Breeze. Central Europe On-line, 24.3.1998.
87 Anderson, R 'Left-wing government may need to seek new allies’, Financial Times Survey: 
Czech Republic. 19.1.1999.




























































































acknowledged its role and supported the state budget, including the deficit 
proposal for 1999.89 Nonetheless, Prime Minister Zeman at least partly agreed 
with Vaclav Klaus that the CNB shared responsibility for growth in the national 
economy. Not surprisingly, Zeman and Klaus found common grounds for a later 
CSSD/ODS attempt to amend of the law on the Czech National Bank in 2000, 
which envisaged an increase of political influence on the CNB.90
The Tosovsky and Zeman governments have been aware of the damage 
caused to the Czech financial market by the laissez-fair system: a lack of 
transparency and links between key business players and the political sphere. 
The total sum of consolidation measures, started under the liberal government of 
Klaus, amounted to 200 bil Koruna by 1998 - with only limited effect91 and was 
estimated to rise to some 400 bil Koruna by 2001. International standards have 
been gradually introduced, such as a Securities Commission. Minister without 
portfolio Basta, being in charge of the anti-corruption campaign labelled “clean 
hands”, envisaged draft law on financial police and on financial prosecution. 
However, it soon became clear that “a fundamental turn-around will take time, 
as adverse informal structures will have to be overcome”.92 The campaign was, 
however, generally perceived as a failure. Only in 2000 did courts start to deal 
with some of the cases of fraud and ’’tunnelling”.
Unlike the Klaus government’s rather restrictive attitude towards the FDI, 
the Zeman government introduced measures designed to attract FDI and created 
special industrial investment zones.93 The European Commission, however, did 
not allow Prague to establish special economic zones with tax exemptions or 
other economic incentives.94 Nonetheless, foreign direct investment increased 
more than expected.95
89 Z.Balcerova, Po furianstvi musi prijit domluva. Nastala doba ucelneho mixu menove a 
fiskalni politiky? (After Boastfulness it is Time for Agreement. Has the Time of Effective 
Mix of Currency and Fiscal Policy Arrived?), Hospodarske noviny, 28.12.1998, p.6.
90 President Havel, concerned with the growing influence of the two political parties on social 
life in the Czech Republic, predictably voted the law.
91 Wirtschaftslage und Reformprozesse in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Sammelband 1998. Ed.by
H. Machowski, H.Wilkens (Berlin: DIW, 1998) p. 45.
92 J.Poschel, Czech Republic ...
93 The Zeman government adopted a plan of Minister Gregr, designed especially for the cities 
Kladno and Karvina. Investori dostanou "hotove pozemky” (Investors to Get Ready-Made 
Sites), Hospodarske noviny, 7.1.1999.
94 Specialni ekonomicke zony Evropska Union nepovoli (EU Bans Special Economic Zones), 
Hospodarske noviny 26.1.1999, p.l and 3.
95 Poland gained 25, Hungary 17 and Czech Republic 8 bill US doll, in 1989-1998. V.Brabec 





























































































The privatisation process of major Czech banks, planned but not 
implemented under Klaus, received an important push under Tosovsky and has 
proceeded fast under Zeman. The CSSD criticised its liberal rivals for 
establishing undeclared state capitalism. Its election promise was to consolidate, 
restructure and privatise the ’’state capitalist enterprises”.96 In 1998, the 
Tosovsky government sold its share in the IPB (Investment and Post Bank), to 
Nomura Securities - the deal prepared still under the Klaus government.97 In 
March 1999, the CSSD government approved a plan to sell its stakes in two 
other major banks. The Ceska sporitelna was sold to Erste Bank Sparkasse and 
the CSOB was sold to Belgian KCB. The privatisation of Komercni Banka was 
expected in 2001.
Social Democrats, unlike the Tosovsky team, envisaged not only a 
concept of industrial policy: it focused on a revitalisation programme for major 
industrial companies before their further privatisation. In this and other issues, 
the CSSD was not united as to the role of the state. The plan represented by 
Minister Gregr preferred a more extensive, state-centred approach.98 Within the 
party the project gained considerable support. Within the government, however, 
the more liberal plan of Deputy Prime Minister Mertlik gained the upper hand 
even if the decision of the government was to combine elements of both.99 The 
Revitalisation Agency began operation in 2000.
In plans for privatisation of producers/distributors of gas and electricity, 
the concept of Minister Gregr received the upper hand in 2000. The government 
decided to sell package deals to large owners and their alliances, thus 
maintaining a centralised structure in both areas -  apparently in order to create 
companies strong enough to compete on the EU market. Minister of Agricultural 
Fencl produced the plan of the revitalisation of the Czech agriculture on the way 
into the EU. The plan included extensive subsidies and argued in favour of a 
better protection for the Czech agrarian market. Initially it had even presupposed 
a revision of the European Agreement and the Czech agreement with the 
WTO.100
96 See Volebni program Ceske strany socialne demokraticke (Election Programme of the 
Czech Social Democratic Party), In: Spolecne s Vami pro lepsi budoucnost (Together With 
You for a Better Future). (1998), p. 12.
97 In 2000, however, the government decided to re-establish its control over the IPB given its 
critical situation. In a swift and controversial move its stake in the IPB to the CSOB for a 
symbolic price and offered took a guarantee for the older IPB unhealthy loans.
9“ On the programme of Minister Gregr see: Industry revitalisation program, Hospodarske 
noviny, 4.2.1999,p. 19.
99 Mertlik plan market driven, Hospodarske noviny, 16.3.1999, p.23.





























































































All the measures proved that the rhetoric of the CSSD notwithstanding, its 
economic policy neither introduced expansive fiscal policy nor increased 
dramatically the role of the state. It is true that the state debt increased gradually 
and reached disturbing levels by 2001. The Czech Republic did not meet the 
Maastricht criteria regarding the state budget.101 However, the policy as a whole 
focused rather on the establishment of an institutional framework for the 
national economy and on the privatisation process. Even the purpose of the 
program for revitalisation was not to increase the role of the state but to 
improve the economic performance of the enterprises with a considerable share 
of state investment and prepare them for further privatisation. In any case, the 
CSSD did not introduce a dramatic alteration of the transformation strategy, as 
one might have expected given the CSSD election programme. The 
transformation concept was adjusted largely within the restrictive policy model 
advocated by the IMF.102
Unlike the mid 90s, the Czech public witnessed a broader debate on 
economic strategy in the late 90s: on the one hand the strategy of the 
government combined the development of prudent economic institutions with an 
increase in government spending (the first ever national budget deficit), an 
active agricultural policy and support for a privately managed consolidation 
programme for limited number of key enterprises. On the other, the programme 
has been opposed from a liberal point of view: first the macroeconomic situation 
had to be adjusted, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation completed. Only 
after that could some enterprises be consolidated and market institutions 
improved.103 A group of experts took the middle ground in a call for the urgent 
improvement of the institutional framework of the Czech economy combined 
with fast liberalisation.104
In the meantime the performance of the economy has been poor in 1998- 
1999. The GDP fell 2,7% in 1998 and nearly all other economic indicators 
contributed to a decline.105 The unemployment rate reached an unprecedented 
8,3% in February 1999.106 On a positive note, the composition of exports and
101 Monitor EU-Eweiterung. Mitlel- und Osteuropa: 1/2000 (Deutsche Bank Research) p.45.
102 Jiri Jonas, Svetova ekonomika na prelomu tisicileti (World Economy at the Turn of the 
Century) (Praha: Management Press, 2000), pp. 9-54, here in particular pp.50-54.
103 V.Klaus, Na okraj diskuse s vicepremierem Ceske narodni banky O.Dedkem (On Debate 
With Czech National Bank Vice-Governor Dedek), Hospodarske noviny, 6.4.1999, p.9.
104 See the so called Drevicska vyzva (Drevic Call) Jak ozivit ceskou ekonomiku (How To 
Revive Czech Economy), Hospodarske noviny, 25.3.1999, p.5.
105 Economy nearing depression, Hospodarske noviny, 23.3.1999.
106 KJanacek, V utkani s nezamestnanosti a rozvijenim trhu prace se ani u nas nelze spolehat 
jen na ekonomicky rust (Dealing With Unemployment and developing Labour Market Neither 




























































































imports of the Czech Republic became similar to that of Austria, Germany or 
United Kingdom.107 The dynamics of Czech exports was, however, too low an 
incentive to provide for economic growth. The government’s institutional and 
financial support for exporters - absent or negligible in the early 90s - became 
comparable with that of western standards.108 The decline in GDP in comparison 
with Poland or Hungary was explained by some experts as a difference in the 
cycle of their economic development.109 Optimists expected an improvement in 
the second half of 1999 if supported by active and coherent government 
policy.110 1
The economic situation improved in 2000. Growth reached some 2,7%, 
and industrial production increased by 6%. Given the structural changes, which 
took place in 1997-2000, and thanks to a large increase in FDI, the basic 
characteristics of the Czech economy were more positive than in the mid 1990s. 
111 Apprehensions have been voiced in connection with the growing deficit of 
foreign trade and with dependence on the economic cycles of major foreign 
partner countries -  Germany primarily.112 The inflation rate dropped from 10% 
in 1997 to 2,5% in 1999, and grew to 4% in 2000.113 In 1999 and 2000, the 
Czech Republic received the biggest share of FDI in the ECE region. The influx 
of the FDI reached the level envisaged for the times after of the Czech accession 
to the EU.114 An overall assessment showed that the Czech economy took 
second place (following Slovenia) as far as economic convergence with the EU 
was concerned.115
107 F.Tumovec (ed.): Czech Republic 1998. Facing Reality. Center for economic Research and 
Graduate Education, Charles University. Economic Institute, Academy of Science of the 
Czech Republic. Prague, December 1998, p.56
108 The support has been provided for by several state run organisations: the EGAP (state run 
export insurance), the CEB (Czech Export Bank) and the CzechTrade (export support 
agency).
109 Mezinarodni srovnani neni priznive (International Comparison Unfavourable), 
Hospodarske noviny, 24.3.1999, p.3.
110 Mertlik: Worst almost over, better on way, Hospodarske noviny, 23.3.1999
111 The cumulative avalue of FDI by the end of 1999 reached (in mill USD) 16 246 in the 
Czech Republic, 19 276 in Hungary and 28 000 in Poland. Rudolf Olsovsky, Zahranicm 
investice letos smerujf zejmena do sluzeb (FDI Flow into Services this Year), Hospodarske 
noviny 14.9.2000, p.8.
112 Eva Zmrazilova, Priznive zmeny neodstranily riztzikove tendence (Positive Changes 
Introduced, Risk Tendences Conserved), Hospodarske noviny, 2.1.2001, p.13.
113 Vladimir Brabec, Letosni inflace bude mime vyssi nez loni (Inflation to Grow Slightly in 
2001), Hospodarske noviny, 11.1.2001.
114 Richard Podpiera, Jak dlouho bude pokracovat priliv penez (How Long Will Continue the 
Influx of Money), Hospodarske noviny, 4.1.2001, p.13.





























































































It is predicted that the Czech economy will reach the average level of 
economic performance of the EU countries by 2020.116 Bankruptcy legislation, 
in operation since mid 2000, as well as the government programme of support 
for most promising and important firms, at last managed to cut down the large 
number of insolvent firms substantially.
The analysis of the winner/looser balance of the Czech integration into the 
EU proved that the sooner accession happens, the sooner Czech Republic could 
reap its benefits, becoming an overall winner of the accession.117 This logic 
played a considerable role in Czech accession strategy aimed at speeding up the 
negotiation process.
4.2 FOREIGN POLICY TESTS
The continuity in foreign policy under the Social Democratic government was 
tested in its approach to the Czech bid for membership of NATO. The CSSD 
effectively gave up its original demand to convene a referendum on Czech 
membership of the Alliance.118 The government concentrated successfully on 
co-operation with its Polish and Hungarian partners in diplomatic activities 
supporting their common goal. The progress in preparations for membership 
was more controversial. On the one hand the government successfully produced 
a national security strategy, drafted a concept of foreign and security policy and 
a military doctrine. On the other, except for some specially trained and equipped 
segments highly compatible with NATO standards, the army is still undergoing 
a slow and distracted process of transformation.
On a political level, Czech policy revealed its heterogeneity in the first 
test as a NATO member state. Taking a position on NATO air strikes in Kosovo 
in March 1999, the government stressed several times that “the decision to 
attack was made before we became a member” (Minister Kavan). The ODS took 
an even more reserved position.119 Czech policy was not prepared to exercise 
political leadership vis-à-vis the Czech public. The CSSD government 
elaborated a joint initiative with Greece, which found a controversial echo both 
in the Alliance as well on the Czech political scene as it called for an immediate
116 Jiri Vavron, Cesko se ma dostat na uroven EU za dvacet let (Czechia To Achieve EU 
Levels in 20 Years), Pravo, 5.1.2001., p. 15
117 Pavlik, The Czech Republic.....p.142.
118 The CSSD usually referred to the fact that its own draft laws on public vote never passed 
the Parliament.
119 Klaus protrhl jednotny postoj politiku zemi NATO k utoku (Klaus Broke Through the 
United Line of Politicians of NATO States On the Attack), Pravo, 25.3.1999, p.1-2. For the 





























































































end of the NATO bombardment. In the aftermath of the conflict and after 
Milosevic had been ousted from power, the government’s ’’soft” defection from 
the strict Atlanticists position opened some new room for manoeuvre for the 
Czech diplomacy welcomed by NATO and the EU.
Other issues, mainly relations with Slovakia and Germany, also received 
special attention. Improvement of relations with Slovakia proved to depend on 
the departure of the national populist Vladimir Meciar and his government. 
While the Tosovsky government clearly preferred a constructive dialogue, 
Vladimir Meciar chose to ignore Prague. Once again, the peculiar relationship 
between Klaus and Meciar came to the fore: Meciar refused to deal with the 
government, which came after Klaus had to step down. Obviously, he was 
anxious to repay the same attitude of Vaclav Klaus, who ignored - to the dismay 
of Czech public - the liberal democratic coalition in Slovakia, which put down 
Meciar temporarily in 1994. The election victory of the Slovak anti-Meciar 
opposition in September opened a new chapter in mutual Czech-Slovak 
relations. It was clearly high time: the new Slovak government lindicated that 
Meciar’s secret service might have been engaged in subversive actions against 
the Czech Republic and other neighbouring states in order to hamper their 
admission into NATO.120 12The intensity of contacts became unprecedented, with 
outspoken Czech support for the Slovak bid for EU-accession talks and its 
admission to NATO. A traditional problem became obvious: Czech policy had 
to search for a balanced approach, which would prevent a revival of Slovak 
feeling of being patronised by the bigger partner - now even “bigger” as a 
member of the Atlantic Alliance. In practical terms, both sides were trying to 
arrive at a solution to some still controversial issues relating to the division of 
federal property of former Czechoslovakia -  such as like the controversial issue 
of a division of assets and liabilities of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and the 
transfer of 4,5 mil tons of Slovak gold. The division of the federal property was 
finalised at last in 1999 -  including the transfer of Slovak gold to Bratislava. 
The Czech and Slovak privatisation agencies have established more intensive
links, which should ease the exercising of property rights of their clients in the 
121partner country.
120 So in relation to the Czech Republic a secret action 'Neutron', directed against Czech 
membership in NATO, and "Dezo', focused on increase neo-fascist organisations against the 
Romany population. The authors calculated with negative Western reaction to anti-Romany 
population and therefore with blockage of NATO admission of Czech Republic. Meciarova 
tajna sluzba chtela ztizit vstup Prahy do NATO (Meciar’s Secret Service Sought to Hamper 
Prague’s Admission to NATO), Mlada Fronta Dues, 16.2.1999, p.l and 7.
121 Obcane CR an SR by meli mit jednodussi pristup ke svym akciim (Citizens of Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic Should Get an Easier Access to their Shares) Hospodarske 
noviny, 26.3.1999. p. 13. According to the article 300 000 of Slovaks invested their 




























































































In relations with Germany both sides could exploit the 
the bilateral declaration of January 1997. The implementation 
included the institutionalisation of relations: a Czech-German 
channelled the Czech/Sudeten German dispute into a broader social framework 
and bridged its exclusiveness. A Czech-German Fund for the Future started to 
pay the victims of the Nazi-regime social support. Some of the Funds activities 
were opened to the Sudeten-German anti-fascists as well. It became obvious that 
dealing with the past presupposed elements of broad social dialogue, 
compensation and political co-operation and a high level of
institutionalisation.122 Yet another important step to mutual understanding was 
achieved during M. Zeman’s visit to Bonn in March 1999 where Zeman 
declared the so called ‘Benes decrees’ ’’extinct”, the German Chancellor 
Schroder confirmed that the demands of the Sudeten-Germans will not be an 
inherent element of German foreign policy.123 Obviously, the German 
conservative parties were not ready to go so far. The CSU even established 
parallels between ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and expulsion/transfer of Sudeten 
Germans from the post-war Czechoslovakia.124 At the same time, the 
improvement of relations was evident in Czech-Bavarian co-operation in crucial 
bilateral issues as well.
The Tosovsky and Zeman governments helped to invigorate regional co­
operation in the format of the ’’Visegrad three”. Since the Slovak elections in 
October 1998, the Visegrad co-operation has been essential for Slovakia’s 
intensive preparation for EU- and NATO-accession.
4.3 STANDING OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ON INTEGRATION 
ISSUES
The 1998 elections did not bring a substantially new emphasis as far as EU 
accession is concerned. Given the self-confident tone of the ODS election 
campaign, its programme did not move from its earlier positions. It supports 
accession to the EU as ”a further important goal” (after joining NATO). The aim







122 See the report on a conference of German, Czech, Polish and British historians on the 
issue or reconciliation: Coming to the terms with the past, opening up to the future, 
Conference Report, Ed by V.Handl, Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham, 
1998/19, here mainly the contribution of Dr Lily Gardner Feldman, pp.2-3.
123 Results of the talks between Chancellor Schroder and Czech Premier M Zeman in Bonn, 
8.3.1999,
Bonn verzichtet auf Vertriebenen-Anspriiche. Schroder: Vermogensfragen erledigt - 
Tschechischer Regierungschef Zeman: Benesch-Dekrete erloschen, Die Welt, 9.3.1999
124 Rede des CSU-Vorsitzenden, Ministerprasident Dr. Edmund Stoiber (Auszug aus der 




























































































is a Europe of nations. The party’s approach to the EU, however, was presented 
as ’’realistic and not naive”. It rejects the rigid model of the welfare state. The 
Czech Republic should not dissolve in either a supranational structures or in a 
’’Europe of regions”.125 A resolved supporter of the intergovernmental approach 
to integration, the ODS’ criticism of the EU increased apparently with the 
growing role of the EU Commission during the pre-accession period and the 
personal engagement of Commissioner Verheugen. Vaclav Klaus’s reserved 
attitude was manifested by his suggestion that the referendum about the EU- 
accession should be held in early 2001 -  well before the accession talks were 
expected to be concluded.126 The target date of Czech accession in 2003 was 
regarded as unrealistic. The party supported a multispeed EU and envisaged 
standing for a unification of the EU and NAFTA. The European Monetary 
Union was criticised as a unitarisation of Europe. A future communitarisation of 
Europe was rejected as it threatened to limit the liberal freedom of choice.127 
Analysts, close to the leadership of the ODS, rejected the EU as a threat to 
European democracy: democratic Europe and the EU were presented as two 
antagonistic directions of policy and civilisation.128 Accession to an EU, which 
would involve common taxation and social security, was perceived as 
unacceptable.129 The shadow foreign minister of ODS Zahradil even started to 
speculate about the ’’Turskish model” of relations with the EU based on a 
customs union.
Obviously, the party leadership’s position on the EU shifted towards more 
criticism. The national interest and sovereignty took an even more prominent 
role on the party’s ideological agenda.130
This attitude contrasted with the approach of the President who elaborated 
on his concept of the EU institutional development in 1999 and 2000. He 
expressed his preference for a federal Europe, the establishment of a second 
chamber of the European Parliament and suggested the EU should adopt a 
European Constitution.131
125 Hlavu vzhuru! Volebni Program ODS (1998) (Heads Up! Election Programme of the 
ODS).
126 2.6.2000
127 Vaclav Klaus, Liberalismus: Krise Oder Hoffnung?, Europaische Rundschau-. 2/1999, p.79.
128 Miloslav Bednar, Evropa a Evropska Unie jako otazka budoucnosti demokracie (Europe 
and EU as a Question of Prospects of Democracy), Mezinarodni politika: 1/2001, p.19.
129 See report on Jan Zahradil’s contribution during a seminar.' Reformy EU mohou zpomalit 
nase prijeti (EU-reform May Slow Down Our Admission), Hospodarske noviny, 9.7.1999, 
P-2.
30 Vaclav Klaus, Evropa stojf na krizovatce (Europe at the Crossroads), Lidové noviny, 
7.7.1999




























































































The CSSD came up with a rather detailed, conceptual programme. It 
stressed its consent with the principles of the Maastricht Treaty and argued that 
the Czech Republic should participate in all EU policies. Special emphasis was 
laid on social policy. The programme envisages the negotiation of transition 
periods as the Czech Republic moves to join the EU. Clearly pointing at the 
ODS, Social Democrats rejected a negativist approach to the EU, nationalist 
positions and megalomania which may result in the isolation of the Czech 
Republic. 132
The KDU-CSL was more specific than in its earlier programmes. It 
stressed the will to participate within the EU on ’’projects, where the European 
Union evolves in different speeds.” The stress here is put on Monetary Union, 
the Schengen Agreement, and the Protocol on Social Policy and CFSP.'33 
Similarly, the US and the ODA adopted predictably Euro-optimist programmes 
and distanced themselves from the attitude of the ODA.134
The Communist Party visibly adjusted its vision of the EU compared with 
1992. It expressed its support for integration into the EU ”on an equal basis”, 
approved by a public vote. Nonetheless, especial emphasis, like in former 
documents, was put on ’’further development of state sovereignty” and ’’national 
existence”: a ’’growing one sided dependence” has been warned against.135
Integration policy became one of the major topics of conceptual and 
political activity of the individual parties. With 1998 being an election year, 
however, priorities shifted in other directions. Given the lasting dispute over 
apple import limitations and anti-dumping procedures no party could hope to 
gain mass electoral support by making EU membership a key point of its 
campaign. All of the major political parties confirmed to Klaus van der Pas, 
European Commission’s chief negotiator, that they would be committed to 
preparation of the country for accession to the EU whatever the outcome of the 
elections. The European Commission expected continuity in post-election Czech
www.hrad.cz/president/HaveI/Speaches
132 Alternativa pro nasi zemi (volebni program CSSD, 1998) Alternative for Our Country 
(Election programme of the CSSD, 1998).
133 Podrobny volebni program 1998 (Detailed Election Programme 1998). 
http://www.kdu.ez/Volby/PSP/1998/V98VPP8.htm#Zahraniei
134 Svoboda a râd - brâna do 3. tisîciletî. Politickÿ program Unie svobody (Freedom and
Order. Political Programme of the Freedom Union, US). Praha, 9. 2.1998
(http://www.unie.cz/dokumenty/program_en.html); Dàl na ceste ke svobodné spolecnosti. 
Smlouva pro budouenost. Volebni program Obcanské demokratické aliance (Forward 
Towards Free Society. Agreement for the Future. Election Programme of the Civic 
Democratic Alliance, ODA), 1998 (http://www.oda.cz/dokumenty/program_komplet.asp);




























































































policy vis-à-vis the EU.136 With the 1998 elections the Republican Party 
became irrelevant with regards to the debate on EU membership, as it did not 
manage either to enter the Chamber of Deputies or get a seat in the Senate.
The elections o f 2002 were increasingly looked at from the point of view 
of Czech accession to the EU. Not the ’’colour” of the future government but its 
attitude towards the EU was regarded as the crucial question with long-term 
implications.137 Minister Kavan expressed confidence that the Czech Republic 
would not waste the historical chance to join the EU as the Czech political 
parties ’’achieved a high level of consensus” regarding the EU-accession.138 
There was, however, no clear consensus as far as the construction of EU and its 
long-term future was concerned. Indeed, the differentiation of the political scene 
has been continuing, having been initiated by the debate in the EU itself.
4.4 INTEGRATION POLICY - IN SEARCH OF CONCERTED 
ACTION
The pace of preparation for EU membership proved to be slow under the 
conservative governments. Both Tosovsky and Zeman declared the acceleration 
of pre-accession preparations as one of their priorities. Having a limited 
mandate, the Tosovsky government focused rather on preparations for 
negotiations for EU accession.139 At the political level, the records of both 
governments were mostly positive: the dichotomy vis-a-vis the EU did not 
effect the government’s policy any more. Jaroslav Sedivy, the minister of 
foreign affairs appointed under Klaus and kept by Tosovsky, declared that the 
Czech policy sought membership in a strong and effectively functioning EU.140 
The distance from important elements of the integration process has been 
preserved and further developed in the statements of the ODS and its Chairman 
Vaclav Klaus, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech
136 Cinitele EU vyjadruji nadeji, ze volby nezpomali prijimani CR (EU Representatives 
Express their Hope, that Elections Will not Slow Down the Admission of the CR) Ceske 
Noviny, CTK, 18.3.1998.
137 Michal Klima, Kdo nas povede doe unie? (Who Will Lead US Into the EU?), Hospodarske 
noviny, 10.1.2001,
138 Zahranicni politika Ceske republiky v roce 2000 (Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic in 
2000) Vystoupenf mfstopfedsedy vlady a ministra zahranicmch vecl Ceske republiky Jana 
Kavana v Zahranicnim vyboru Poslanecke snemovny Parlamentu Ceske republiky dne 
(speech of Minister Kavan in front of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of 
Deputies) 3.2.2000
139 Programove prohlaseni vlady Ceske republiky (Programme Declaration of the Czech 
government), Ceske Noviny (CTK) 27.1 1998
40 Sedivy: CR chce vstoupit do silne unie (Sedivy: CZ Wants to Become Member of a Strong 




























































































Parliament. The supporters of the ODS have, however, remained the most pro- 
European segment of the society and Vaclav Klaus, unlike some other 
representatives of the ODS, do not seek an alternative to EU-accession. The 
chief negotiator Telicka, the person constantly exposed to communication with 
the EU-partners, observed that the “damaged image” of the country has been 
improving gradually as a result of “current, essentially positive developments” 
in the Czech Republic.141 The government recognised that preparation for EU 
membership and the transformation process of the country have been closely 
linked. The target date for the Czech Republic to be prepared for membership 
has remained January the 1st, 2003.
The pace of negotiations and regular assessments of the candidate 
countries’ readiness to join the EU created an increasingly tight schedule for 
national policy making in all relevant areas. The sluggish pace of structural 
economic reforms and of the legislative process, as well as the slow reform of 
public administration before 1998 had a negative effect on the process of 
preparation for accession. The CSSD government argued the problems indicated 
faults of the transformation process as such. This view was opposed by the ODS 
and is not necessarily shared by all experts.
The need to prepare for EU membership became, next to economic issues, 
a major element of domestic policymaking. The need to step-up preparations for 
EU accession were occasionally a reason for considerations regarding the 
eventual transformation of the minority government into a coalition government 
with a convenient majority.142 The minority government was perceived as too 
weak and unable to put through the parliamentary legislation needed for 
admission to the EU.
The CSSD government continued in most cases the policy line of the 
previous Tosovsky government. The Tosovsky cabinet put legal approximation 
high on its agenda. The overarching priority was an elaboration of the national 
pre-accession strategy and negotiating position vis-a-vis the EU. The Working 
Committee for Integration started the preparations for negotiations in November 
1997 perceiving the most urgent task to be the formulation of a clear Czech 
position on EU legislation in preparation for the first screening round of 
negotiations.
141 Pavel Telicka, Ze zapisniku vyjednavace (From the Negotiator’s Notebook), Smer 
Evropska unie (attachement to Mezinarodni politika): 2/2000, p.18.
142 J.Pehe, Cestu do Unie asi ztizi politikareni (The Road to Union May be Aggravated by 




























































































The legislative plans of both Tosovsky and the CSSD governments (the 
latter promised to create a “legislative hurricane”) targeted amendment and 
further development of legislative and institutional frameworks, complying with 
the acquis communautaire. The implementation of the legislative plan, however, 
has been lagging behind schedule. More than the lack of support in parliament, 
the cause seemed to be low performance of the government’s
agencies/ministries responsible for the elaboration of individual norms and 
probably still insufficient co-ordination, which prevented the legislative activity 
from being really effective.
The impact of admission to the EU has remained, however, largely not 
widely recognised. After a public information campaign about NATO 
membership was belatedly started in mid 1997, activities in this respect 
concerning the EU began in the autumn of 1997 (the Day of Europe in Plzen, 
November 1997). The Committee for European Integration of the Czech 
government therefore approved the basis of the Communication Strategy of the 
Czech Republic Prior to Entry into the European Union and started a massive 
information and education campaign in the media in early 1998, using funding 
from the PHARE programme.
Many problems on the road to Czech EU-membership have been 
politically sensitive. The Tosovsky government, under pressure of approaching 
June elections in 1998, decided to stand up for domestic apple producers while 
the EU ministers, taking this case as an important occasion to discipline the 
Czech government, responded in February by the suspension of preferential 
import tariffs on Czech pork, poultry and fruit juice. The measure, legitimate in 
view of the critical situation of the Czech agriculture sector, was poorly 
managed and discriminatory vis-a-vis the EU. The painful retreat of Prague was 
inevitable. Further “politicisation” of the dispute threatened to harm Czech 
integration policy and affect other areas as well. The Zeman government 
negotiated a more successful end to the pork question at the end of 1998.
The economic recession pushed public consent for membership below the 
level of 50% in mid 1997. The new change of government atmosphere of 
concentrated reform policy and positive rhetoric of the Tosovsky government 
raised it to 63%. By the end of 1998 the level decreased back to the usual 57%. 
The level of disapproval of accession to the EU (23,4% in November 1998) 
became unexpectedly high in November 1998, which might be attributed to the 
current image of the EU, damaged by the devastating effect of subsidised EU 
exports of pork to the Czech market.143 Indeed, Czech policymakers criticised
143 Results of public opinion research conducted by Sofres-Factum in November 1998. In: 




























































































the EU for being protectionist in particular in the trade of agriculture production. 
The CSSD held the former governing coalition responsible for having negotiated 
an unfavourable trade provision of the Czech association treaty in 1993.144 The 
Czech Republic, it was argued, should defend its interests against some of the 
EU member states.145 Opinion research confirmed considerable reservations to 
Czech membership in the EU. According to this data (gathered on the basis of 
different research questions than in the above mentioned November ‘98 
research) support for membership of the EU decreased from 72% in July 1998 to 
64% in March 1999. During the same period opposition to membership grew 
from 28% to 36%.146 Even more disturbing was the ongoing cleft between the 
political elite and the general public: while the policymakers increasingly 
stressed the need to adopt and implement the EU norms in all relevant areas, the 
public does not pay much attention to this process and focuses on day-to-day 
problems like the defence of democracy and the fight against the organised 
crime. The gap reflects a low level of EU-competence among Czech 
policymakers, who are not able to explain the relevance of EU norms to the 
public.147 Later the public returned to a positively reserved attitude: in 
November 2000, during a teoretical public vote, 54,6% of those asked would 
have voted in favour of Czech accession to the EU, while 21,6% would have 
opposed it.148
Nearly all of the Czech business community supports Czech membership 
of the EU. Dependent on exports and interested in a fair economic and legal 
environment, the business community expects EU membership to have, under 
certain conditions, mainly positive effects. 82% of small and medium firms 
favoured an EU-membership and 18% opposed it in 2000. They expected the 
EU-membership to enlarge the market for their goods and services (18%), 
further ease the movement, accessibility and inflow of EDI (14%), growth of
6.1.1999
144 Evropska Unie se vuci CR chova protekcionisticky. Rozhovor s ministrem zahranicmch 
vecl Ceske republiky Janem Kavanem. (EU is Projectionist Vis-a-Vis the CR. Interview with 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kavan). Lidove noviny, 28. 12. 1998
145 Vuci unii se musime chovat jako hrdy partner (We Have To Be Proud Partner In Relations 
With EU), Interview with the Vice-Premier Egon Lansky, Provo 12. 12. 1998
146 See results of the periodical public research, conducted by the STEM. Mela by CR 
vstoupit do EU? Nazory verejnosti (Should the CR join the EU? Public Opinion.) 
Hospodarske noviny, 1.4.1999, p.2
147 Josef Lenert, Strany v evropske pasti (Parties in European Trap), Hospodarske noviny, 
18.4.2000
148 In Poland the relevant figures were 61,6% and 20,4% and in Hungary 53,5% and 14%. See 





























































































sales (8%) etc.149 The most frequently mentioned apprehensions concerned 
increase of competition (79%) reduction of Czech firms on the market (68%), 
growing misbalance between large and small/medium size firms (64%), ’’brain 
drain” (64%) etc. The strongest apprehensions were expressed by the 
construction firms.150 Worries prevail also in individual sectors of the economy 
concerning a low level of competitiveness - among others in the electronics 
industry, banking and insurance etc.
The trade unions support EU-membership very strongly. The social 
standards of the EU are attractive. The Unions called, however, for a social 
dialogue on accession, which should run parallel to preparation for accession 
and accession talks.
One of the examples of changing attitudes to the EU was the fact that the 
Zeman government focused on a more effective use of the funding received 
from the EU through PHARE. Unlike the government of Vaclav Klaus, it 
acknowledged the importance of EU structural funds and adjusted the regional 
structure in order to fit the criteria of the EU. Also, the government speeded up 
preparation for participation in the EU structural policy. Prague as well as Czech 
regions became aware of the advantages, which the structural funds offered. At 
the same time, having endorsed the 1,27% of the GDP as the maximum level of 
national contribution to the EU budget, Prague was well aware that the structural 
policy faced inevitable changes. It acknowledged that a simple extension of the 
policy to new members threatened to explode the EU budget.151
The planned creation of fourteen Higher Self-governing Local Units and 
regional administration did not fit the needs of the structural funds of the EU and 
has been criticised by Minister Kavan. A special law had to be passed to comply 
with the EU merging the fourteen units into eight statistical units (NUTS 2). The 
implementation of the reform of public administration Prague responded to the 
consistent criticism from the side of the EU. It was acknowledged that the public 
administration seriously deteriorated in 1990-1998: with abolishment of the 
medium level of self-government and administration in early 90s the system 
became too etatist and centralised, as well as poorly co-ordinated along 
horizontal lines. Moreover, professional competence as well as public and 
professional control was clearly deficient.152
149 Marie Pavlu, Postoje a nazory ceskych firem na Evropskou unii (Czech Firms: Attitudes 
and Views Regarding EU), Smer Evropska unie: 6/2000, p.7.
150 Pavlu, Postoje a nazory ceskych firem..., p.8.
151 Milan Fridrich, Politika soudrznosti a strukturalni fondy (Cohesion Policy and Structural 
Funds), Smer Evropska unie'. 2/2000, p. 18-19.




























































































Mostly relevant policymakers and experts have followed the internal 
development o f the EU. Clearly, Czech policy remains absorbed mostly by the 
domestic problems and enlargement agenda. However, the resignation of the 
Klaus government in 1997 resulted in a change of some basic assumptions 
regarding the EU. The Zeman government reacted in a relaxed manner to the 
change of priorities in German foreign policy. The German “new realism”, 
stressing the reform agenda of the EU before enlargement was accepted without 
any noticeable anxiety as was the resignation of the European Commission in 
March 1999.153 Czech policy left open the option of access to the EURO. The 
decision will depend on the success of the EURO itself. Czech banks will not 
currently be able to stand the competition in the banking sector of the EURO- 
zone.154
In sharp contrast to the ODS, the government endorsed the concept of a 
federal Europe, as proposed by Minister Fischer. In detail, however, the final 
shape of the EU hardly became a subject of the national discourse. The long­
term co-ordinates have remained rather nebulous. It showed understanding for 
introduction of the principle of ‘flexibility’ into the integration process -  as long 
as it did not result in ’’second-class membership”.155 Czech diplomacy regarded 
the European Conference mostly a relevant multilateral forum for discussion of 
crucial integration issues.
Prague welcomed the results of the Helsinki summit as it opened the way 
to accession talks with further countries -  most crucially Slovakia. The Summit 
in Nice in 2000 and its institutional stipulations were assessed mostly 
favourably. The summit was perceived as an opening of the EU for enlargement. 
The tough bargaining tactics of the smaller EU-countries for the increase of their 
votes in the Council has been viewed with a great deal of sympathy.156 
Obviously, Prague perceives the link between the Czech interests and the 
interests of the smaller EU-countries as more natural than a less likely alliance 
with any of the large EU-member states. In the issue of the candidate status of 
Turkey, Czech diplomacy was close to the position of the USA and Germany. 
The perspective of European and Mediterranean stability and security played a
Like Our Public Administration?) Smer Evropska Unie: 2/2000, pp.6-7.
153 So the clearly positive reaction to the agenda of German EU-presidency during the visit of 
Joschka Fischer in Prague on 7.1.1999, See Z.Petracek, M.Szymanowski, Joschka Fischer 
Reisen, Respekr. 3/11.-17.1.1999, p.3.
154 EMU zrejme ohrozi ceske banky (EMU Expected to Threaten Czech Banks), Hospodarske 
noviny, 27.1.1999, p.l and 3.
155 New era in EU membership talks? Read between the lines, EU’s Solana, Kavan may be 
talking same language, Hospodarske noviny, 15.6.2000, p.23.





























































































crucial role. Prague perceived the admission criteria as realistic and relevant also 
for Turkey.
Even if Germany has been regarded as the most important actor of the 
enlargement process, Prague sought to avoid the impression that it focused 
solely on Germany. It developed a wide range of contacts with all EU-member 
states. It concluded an action plan with Britain, initiated by the British side. Its 
major purpose was British assistance to the Czech Republic to access the EU by 
2003. The Czech policy did not elaborate a comparable concept of action with 
any other EU-country.157
Institutions
After the elections of June 1998 the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech 
Parliament established a Committee for European integration. The latter became 
a profiled parliamentary body with a growing expertise on integration matters.
At the top of the executive institutional set-up remained the inter-sectoral 
Government Committee for European Integration. The reshuffle in its leadership 
just demonstrated the rather slow start of implementation of the pro-active and 
pro-European integration policy. Between September 1998 and November 1999, 
the Committee was not been headed by the Premier but by the newly established 
Vice-Premier for Foreign and Security Policy (Egon Lansky). After it had 
become too obvious that the rather independent post of the Vice-Premier 
represented a disturbing element in the institutional structure, Premier Zeman 
took over the chairmanship of the Committee (December 1999). Minister Kavan 
replaced Egon Lansky as the Vice-Prime Minister for Foreign and Security 
Policy and coated both posts. The chief negotiator and Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Telicka was appointed the State Secretary and First Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the institutional structure of Czech integration 
policy was streamlined and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enhanced.
The Committee comprises the relevant ministers, the Governor of the 
CNB, President of the Supreme Supervisory Office and the Deputy Foreign 
Minister, chief negotiator. The latter heads the Working Committee for 
European Integration. The number of working groups led by experts of 
individual ministries grew to 35 in 1998. Representatives of trade unions and 
employers associations participate in the work of some of the working groups as
157 The plan covers such areas of co-operation as trade, employment policy, environment 
protection, reform of the social security system, agriculture, justice and public administration, 
human rights and security. See Vstup v roce 2003 je realny (Accession in 2003 Realistic) 




























































































well. There is another expert team for European Integration in the framework of 
the tripartite negotiations between the government, trade unions and employers. 
The negotiating team consists of the State Secretary Telicka and twelve 
advisors, who provide him with expert support, detailed data and arguments in 
relevant questions.158
The institutional structure of the process of approximation of law has been 
even more concentrated. The EC Law Compatibility Department was moved 
from the Ministry of Justice and has been subordinated to the Office for 
Legislation and Public Administration, which is headed by the Deputy Prime 
Minister for Legislation Pavel Rychetsky.
The representatives of employers and employees participated at the 
process of integration into the EU through a Working Team of the Council of 
Economic and Social Agreement, headed by State Secretary Telicka.
As mentioned above, the lack o f experienced experts has represented the 
critical issue of the institutional arrangement of Czech integration policy. The 
situation has not changed considerably since the mid 90s, as State Secretary 
Telicka indicated when he confirmed that “the pool of top experts familiar with 
the issues in question and relevant EU legislation is not very large... This is 
because we have neglected the preparation of public administration employees. 
As a result, we currently face a number of problems”.159 Additional institutions 
and agencies have been established in order to govern and facilitate the 
integration process. The National Fund at the Ministry of Finance has been 
created in order to reform the management of PHARE finance within the Czech 
Republic. The sheer extent of PHARE funding and strict administrative 
requirements made it necessary. It amounted to 540 mil ECU in 1990-1999.160 
Also, a National programming and monitoring committee was established 
(December 1998) followed by regional monitoring committees. By 2000, three 
regions started to implement pilot projects using the structural funds -  the NUTS 
II region Northwest and two micro-regions. The Czech Republic started 
preparation for the programme SAPARD (pre-accession program for 
agricultural sector) integrating it into the national ’’Plan for Development of 
Agriculture and the Countryside for 2000-2006”. Institutional and procedural 
difficulties persisted in the near-border region programme management. The
158 EU Membership Talks Launched. An interview with Pavel Telicka, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and the chief negotiator for accession of the CR into the EU. Euro Info: Nov.- 
Decemb.1998, p.4.
159 Telicka ..., Ibid., p.3.
160 Until now the PHARE funding was transferred to individual Ministries directly from 




























































































incompatibility of the CBC/Phare and the Interreg/structural fund sources was 
openly criticised as it contused the procedures of the cross-border co-operation 
planning.161
All in all the core of the institutional set up for the Czech integration 
policy and negotiations of accession to the EU has been widely perceived as 
straight forward, well focused and staffed and therefore better structured than in 
some other accession states. The State Secretary Telicka was regarded as the 
man clearly “in charge” of both strategic issues as well as practical 
implementation. Nonetheless, the lack of qualified officials and experts as well 
as faults in the co-ordination between individual government bodies represented 
long-term problems of the government’s accession policy.
Trying to Catch Up with the EU Pre-accession Strategy
The problems of Czech integration into the EU are more or less acknowledged. 
The Czech and EU assessments largely correspond. Periodical “big revelations” 
concern mostly the scale of the problems, which have to be dealt with under the 
growing pressure of time. The extensive pre-accession strategy agenda of the 
Czech Republic and a shortage of time add more stress. At the same time even 
multiple pressures have managed to motivate increased and effective activity in 
only some sections of the state apparatus. Evidently, the end of the dichotomy in 
political relations with the EU and the readiness to pinpoint the problems are 
essential and represent an important improvement in Czech integration policy. 
They translated, however, only partly into political, legislative and 
administrative action. A critical mass of problems has been dealt with but the 
overall pace of preparation has been increasing only gradually.
The National Programme for the Preparation of the Czech Republic for 
Membership in the European Union (adopted in early 1998) focuses on the 
harmonisation of laws, their application and enforcement and on the reform of 
public administration at all levels. The major priority with respect to internal 
market is the reform of the financial sector, the approximation of law and 
harmonisation of technical regulations and the conclusion of the European 
Conformity Assessment Agreement. The Czech government focuses on the 
preparation of medium-term macroeconomic strategy, further development of 
regional policy, etc.162
161 Ivo Ryslavy, Implementace programu Phare a priprava na strukturalni fondy 
vpodminkach Ceské republiky (Phare Programme Implementation and Preparation for 
Structural Funds in Czech Conditions), Smer evropska unie: 2/2000, p.5.
162 For concise overview of the Programme look in Petr Pavlik’s Country Report Czech 




























































































The Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaroslav Sedivy argued in 1998 that the 
Czech Republic would like to conclude negotiations on accession by 2000 and 
become a member of the EU early next century. The Czech side has made it 
clear that it would not seek exemptions from the EU, but acceptable transition 
periods and temporary arrangement in certain areas would be necessary, such as 
the sales of agricultural land, environment standards, transport, information 
systems, elements of legislative on agriculture and the free movement of capital. 
Prague insisted from the beginning on maintaining the positive effects of its 
customs union with Slovakia.163
By definition Czech integration policy, and its public reflection, followed 
the timetable of the screening of Czech legislation and accession talks, which 
started in March and November 1998 respectively. On the other hand, a clear- 
cut timing of the accession itself was not demanded with the same urgency as in 
either Poland or Hungary. Czech policy accepted the position of the German 
presidency that the specific timing would be set in early 2000. This rather 
relaxed attitude even provoked speculation about the real interests of the 
government in seeking early admission to the EU.164
In fact it was already the November 1998 first regular report of the 
European Commission on candidate countries, which caused alarm and set 
Prague in a state of shock. For the first time the Czech Republic was described 
as the least prepared (next to Slovenia) of the candidate countries. The low pace 
of implementation of the pre-accession agenda was directly criticised. The 
report focused on a lack of progress in adopting the acquis communautaire and 
its full implementation. Further well known problems were pinpointed, such as 
the state of administration and justice, wide-spread corruption, faults in the 
application of citizenship law, the delayed restructuring of Czech industry, the 
privatisation of strategic enterprises, slow progress in the adoption of EU norms 
in legislation in environment protection and the situation of the Romany 
population.165
Politik at all. Bonn, October 1998, pp.68-69.
163 Sedivy v Bruselu: Czech Republic chce do Unie hned po race 2000 (Sedivy in Brussels. 
The Czech Republic Wants to Become Member Soon After 2000). Slovo 2.4.1998.
164 Rudolf Kucera, Charles University, quoted in Praha se tvari , ze do unie nespecha (Prague 
Makes Impression there is no Hurry with the EU-Accession), Mlada Fronta Dnes, 
15.12.1998, p.l and 12.
165 Komisari EU kritizovali CR za zpozdeni priprav na vstup (EU Commissioners Criticised 




























































































The reaction to the report as well as to the subsequent regular reports of 
1999 and 2000 manifested the differentiation of the Czech political scene in the 
integration issues and revealed patterns of attitude of Czech political actors 
towards the EU.
The governing CSSD, the small centre-right opposition parties, and in 
some cases the KSCM as well, perceived the reports by and large as just and 
realistic. They may have not (and, indeed, did not) accept every detail of the 
assessment. At the same time, the Commission’s major points of criticism were 
well taken.
The representatives of the ODS did not reject every detail of the report but 
rather disapproved of the concept of regular reports as a whole. This attitude 
manifested a more general denial of the right of the EU to assess the accession 
countries and, in particular, rejection of the role of the European Commission in 
the integration process. Vaclav Klaus described the report of 1998 typically as 
biased and as a tactical element of the EU’s negotiation strategy.166
The KSCM, which partly shared the critical opinion of the Commission, 
tended in principle to a rejection of the European Commission’s role as well. It 
stood for national sovereignty and joined the ODS in criticism of the European 
Union as a bureaucratic structure, which, as the KSCM argued, represented 
primarily the interests of monopolies.
Prime Minister Zeman, some four months in office at the time of the first 
report, blamed the governments of Vaclav Klaus and promised a speedy 
improvement. Vaclav Klaus in turn blamed the situation on the Tosovsky and 
Zeman governments. In any case, the report initiated a critical debate and called 
for a realistic self-critical assessment of the real state of Czech society and its 
preparation for EU-accession.167
The approximation of law and its application remain the key problems on 
the path to EU membership: the delays in the process have become critical. 
There seems to be two critical points in the approximation process. One major 
reason for the slow process is the low level of legislative work of individual 
ministries. The draft legal acts, which they produce, are of a low quality and the 
Office for Legislation and Public Administration, headed by the Deputy Prime
166 Zprava Evropske komise: CSSD ano, ODS ne. (European Commission Report. CSSD - 
Yes, ODS - No), Lidove noviny, 1998, 7.11.1998, p.2.
167 So Bedrich Moldan, former Minister of environment protection, at present member of the 
negotiating team for accession talks, in his article: Jak rozumet posudku Evropske unie (How 




























































































Minister for Legislation (Pavel Rychetsky), often has to return them for further 
elaboration. The procedure proved to cause critical delays in legislative activity 
by the end of 1998. Even the problem of the translation of EU legal acts has 
caused considerable problems. A highly qualified translation centre was only 
established at the end of 1998 and faces constant financial problems.168 Based 
originally on PHARE funding, the financial means of the centre have been 
reduced within the state budget for 1999. Rychetsky argued in March 1999 that 
the legislative plan of the government, which the European Commission 
welcomed in 1998, has been caught up with. The Chamber of Deputies became, 
according to him, overburdened by legislative acts. Only several weeks later he 
had to admit that the government was not able to keep its promise.169 Moreover 
of forty legal norms which have been passed by the parliament for approval only 
a few were of direct relevance to Czech admission to the EU. Only 8 of 16 broad 
areas of legislation had been dealt with by the end of March 1999 - the promise, 
given to the European Commission after its negative assessment in November 
1998 was fulfilled by just half. The main problems were in the area of 
telecommunications, consumer protection and state subsidies.
A second negative assessment was expected to have very negative 
implications, including delays in the accession process. After President Havel it 
was Minister Kavan, who pointed out the growing problem.170 In view of the 
problems of the pre-accession process, the ratification of the European Social 
Charter, proposed by the government and vigorously opposed by the ODS (even 
if the Charter was ratified by Poland and Hungary sometime ago) was perceived 
by some commentators as the only visible step the Czech Republic was able to 
make vis-a-vis the EU states.171
One of the most discussed issues became the attitude to the Romany 
population, which remained predominantly negative in Czech society. The 
Tosovsky and Zeman governments increased efforts to fight racist crime.172 The 
Ambassador of the European Commission assessed positively the performance
168 So Deputy Prime Minister Egon Lansky during a session of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the Chamber of Deputies in November 1998. Neumime prelozit legislativu Evropske Unie. 
(We Are Not Able to Translate the Acquis Communautaire), Halo noviny 6.11.1998, p.3.
169 J.Lenert, Misto smrsti mimy vanek (A Breeze Instead of Hurricane), Hospodarske noviny 
8.4.1999, p.6.
170 Kavan: Vstup do EU je ohrozen (Kavan Sees Accession to the EU Under Threat), 
Hospodarske noviny, 22.2.1999, p.2.
171 M.Hrabe, Charta v zrcadle ceske politiky (Charter in the Mirror of Czech Policy), 
Hospodarske noviny, 6.4.1999, p.6.





























































































of the Council of National Minorities.173 174A new Office for Ethnic Equality was 
also established in 1999. After the much-criticised wall, designed to part the 
’’white” and Romany population in the town of Decin, had been dismantled in
1999, the situation became less pointed.
Elad the first regular report been disturbing, the effect of the second one 
(13.10.1999) was nearly devastating. The report pointed to the ongoing 
problems in the Czech justice system, criticised the situation of the Romany 
population, the high level of corruption and economic crime, and the slowness 
of the structural reforms in Czech economy. Most important, the promised 
acceleration of the implementation of the Accession Partnership, in particular 
the law approximation, either did not take place or was not convincing enough.
The patterns of reaction to the report of 1999 were similar to those in 
1998: self-critical reassessment prevailed on the side of the government and the 
“coalition of the four” centre-right opposition parties. The letter had even 
presented their own report in Brussels just before the regular report was 
published. The ODS essentially rejected the report. In general, however, the 
stimulating effect of the “cold shower” was more than sizeable. The government 
as well as the ODS and other parties of the centre right and the President 
understood well that the country could not afford a similarly negative report in
2000. The harsh tone of the report, discussed in the media in considerable detail, 
initiated adoption of a plan of immediate legislative action (November 1999) 
and the above mentioned adjustment of the opposition treaty between the CSSD 
and the ODS (14.2.2000) which included support for a fast-track adoption of 
EU-relevant legislation.
The next regular report (8.11.2000j 114 revealed a great deal of anxiety in 
Czech society regarding the chances to access the EU with the first group of 
“Luxembourg-countries”. Both major politicians as well as the media expected a 
clearly positive evaluation. The expectation was based primarily on increased 
efforts of the government and, indeed, the parliament to speed-up the 
approximation processes. >From mid 2000 on, representatives of the European 
Commission emphasised the positive impact of the increased activity of the 
Czech Republic. Also, there were some indications that Poland was viewed with 
more criticism in Brussels. The comparison with Poland, the assessment of 
which fell out more positively in the report itself, caused considerable frustration 
in Prague. The conviction that Poland - a large country with an assertive
173 CR jde sice spravnym smerem ale pomalu (CR Follows the Right Path But Slow), 
Hospodarske noviny, 2.4.1999, p.2.





























































































diplomacy - plays a special role in the enlargement process was widespread.
The problem seemed to be less in the substance of the critical assessment. 
The report pointed out that in a number of areas - like the free movement of 
goods, capital and services - the Czech Republic was largely prepared to join the 
EU. By September 2000, the Czech legislative activity increased dramatically 
and a concerted action of the ministries, the Parliament and the political parties 
enabled adoption of 200 laws or their amendments. The progress was generally 
perceived as remarkable.175 Nonetheless, in some areas a moderate and in others 
strong criticism were voiced. The moderate criticism concerned the areas of 
agriculture, environment protection and transport. Here the Czech Republic 
progressed considerably but had to increase its effort. A strong criticism 
concerned problems with border controls, police co-operation, and slow reform 
of the judiciary, and the low effect of fight against corruption and economic 
criminality. The EC voiced its concern regarding the area of audiovision as well 
as the attempts to set new limits to the independence of the Czech National 
Bank. Analysts viewed the drafted amendment of the law on the Czech National 
Bank as an example of lack of a coherence in the approach to the institutional 
adjustment to the EU.176
Once again, most of the points were well taken. In some areas Prague 
disagreed, however: for example, Czech officials opposed the Commission’s 
opinion that the Czech Republic (along with Slovenia) belonged to a third group 
of the accession countries as far as economic criteria were concerned.177 The 
general impression of the heated debate and hysteria was, however, that the 
partly irrational lack of self-confidence caused an overreaction on the Czech 
side.
Relations with Austria is another issue, which both reflected and 
influenced diverging Czech attitudes towards the EU. The CSSD government 
joined -  as the only accession country - the unofficial sanctions of the 14 EU- 
member states against Vienna in early 2000. The reason was presumably 
solidarity with the left wing governments in the EU as well as a response to the 
attempts of the new Austrian government to condition the EU-accession of 
Prague by abolition of the Decrees of President Benes. The ODS opposition 
under Klaus strictly rejected the sanctions as an unacceptable intervention into 
the domestic affairs of a sovereign government. The KSCM was split between 
its rebuff of the demands of the nationalist (and pro-Sudeten German) Free Party
175 Monitor EU-Erweiterung ..., p.44.
176 MonitorEU-Erweiterung ..., p.45.
177 Pavel Telicka, Ze zapisniku vyjednavace (From the Negotiator’s Notebook), Smer 




























































































in Austrian government on the one hand and its preference for national 
sovereignty on the other. Not surprisingly the communists took a position 
similar to that of the ODS.
If the CSSD government demonstrated remarkable closeness with 
Brussels in its attitude towards Austria, it sought the Commission’s support in 
its controversy with Vienna concerning the Temelin power plant. The resolution 
of the dispute about the safety and environmental impact of the power plant 
came into an impasse. Prague failed to establish direct and effective contact with 
Vienna -  partly thanks to the sanctions -  while Vienna apparently started 
serious attempts to negotiate the issue with Prague only just before the 
unprecedented Czech investment was completed. Austria refused to close the 
Chapter ’’Energetic” during the EU-accession talks as long as the Temelin issue 
was not settled to its satisfaction and threatened to block Czech admission to the 
EU. Moreover, the popular Austrian blockade of the border crossings caused 
confusion on the border regions. While the Czech public shared the desire to 
make an independent assessment of Temelin’s security standard178, it rejected 
the obstructions on the border. After the 14 EU-countries and the Czech 
Republic lifted the sanctions (September 2000), Prague sought the 
Commission’s mediation. Minister Kavan asked Commissioner Verheugen to 
assist Prague in resuming a direct Czech-Austrian dialogue. Thus, Verheugen 
played an important role in the crucial negotiations in December 2000. Not 
surprisingly, the ODS as well as the KSCM, proponents of a limitted role of the 
Commission, viewed the involvement of the Commission with scepticism.
The approximation o f laws and the implementation capacity of the Czech 
Republic remained the major concern of Czech policy. In many areas, the 
Parliament has to adjust the new (post-1990) or revised legislation to the EU 
requirements. In a number of areas, whole sectors of the legal system have to be 
reorganised in order to avoid internal contradictions and confusion and to 
minimise duplicity. A complex and innovative approach is necessary in many 
areas. So, while the Czech legal system offered a reasonable level of consumer 
protection in most areas by the early 90s, the import of individual EU-norms 
into the Czech legal order threatened to cause a confusion. Therefore, a 
’’Concept of Consumer Legislation” had to be adopted (9.6.1999), which set a 
clear timetable of gradual introduction of the respective EU norms into the 
Czech legal system. The ’’Concept” represented a new instrument in the Czech 
legislative procedure and was met with serious criticism. Its opponents argued 
the ’’Concept” narrowed the search for respective legal instruments of consumer





























































































protection down to search for suitable definitions and formulations.179
One of the most closely watched issues has been the third pillar -  justice 
and home affairs issues. The internal security of the EU is at stake here. The 
illegal immigration problem has been deteriorating. Some 50% of illegal 
migrants from the former Yugoslavia to Germany cross the Czech German 
border.180 The Czech government was, however, reluctant to introduce 
obligatory visa requirements with regards to its eastern neighbours, as it feared a 
decrease in mutual economic trade.181 The Visegrad group failed to co-ordinate 
its attitude on this issue and the Czech Republic re-introduced a visa regime vis- 
a-vis a number of East European and Balkan countries in 1999.
The pace of the accession talks did not entirely satisfy the Czech side. The 
screening of 31 chapters was finished by the autumn of 1999. It proceeded 
without great difficulties including the rather complicated chapters on the energy 
sector and the single market. More problematic were the areas where the Czechs 
would have to make extensive investment: environmental protection, transport 
and infrastructure, or those, which are essential for the EU: agricultural policy, 
the free movement of people, justice and home affairs, and protection of 
border.182 Prague handed in its position documents concerning 29 Chapters and 
by the end of 2000 all 29 Chapters became the object of negotiations. 13 of them 
were preliminarily closed -  being the first ECE accession country to close the 
Chapter "movement of goods”. The latter was perceived by foreign analysts as 
an essential advantage which should create a "political cushion” for the moment 
of the EU’s envisaged decision about the first accession group.183 Nonetheless, 
the pressure was growing on the Czech Republic to catch up with some other 
accession countries (Estonia preliminary closed 15, Hungary and Slovenia 14 
Chapters). Czech diplomacy sought a balanced position between two 
approaches: it was argued that the Prague should not give up negotiating 
positions just in order to "close” more Chapters. Such behaviour would 
negatively impact on the Czech public and economy. At the same time, it was 
well understood that a number of "closed” Chapters could become an important 
criteria for the EU at the moment of decision about who of the candidate
179 Petr Stepan, Cesty k ceskym implementacim evropskeho spotrebitelskeho prava (Way to 
Czech Implementation of European Consumer Protection Law), Smer Evropska unie: 5/2000, 
P-4.
180 So Joschka Fischer during his January 1999 visit to Prague. The migration issue was very 
high on his agenda for the one day visit. See: Fischer apeloval na CR kvuli migraci (Fischer 
Appealed to the CR Regarding Migration), Hospodarske noviny, 7.1.1999, p.2.
181 Tschechien laBt aus Angst vor Moskau seine Ostgrenze offen, Handelsblatt, 27.1.1999, p.8
182 Interview of Pavel Telicka: V jednanich s EU musime uspet (Success of Accession Talks 
Imperative), Hospodarske noviny, 7.1.1999, p.8.




























































































countries should be admitted into the EU.184
The Accession partnerships and the Enlargement Strategy of the EU were 
found convincing and were welcomed. At the same time, Czech diplomacy 
called for a tighter schedule of the negotiations and for more differentiation 
among the accession countries according to their merits.185
The Czech Republic indicated areas in which it requests transition 
periods:
• in the Chapter ’’Culture and Audiovision” a transition period for 
application of the directive ’’Television without frontiers”;
• in the Chapter ’’Energy” a period for creation of oil and gas supplies as 
well as opening of the market for gas and electricity;
• in the Chapter ’’Environment” seven transition periods in different 
areas (recycling of wrapping and package, quality of water, participation 
in the network of protected territories NATURA 2000, integrated 
prevention and curbing of the pollution);
• in the Chapters ’’Free Movement of Capital” and ’’Free Movement of 
People” a transition period for acquisition of secondary residence and 
agricultural land and forests by foreigners;
• in the Chapter ’’Taxes” a period for preservation of reduced VAT as 
well as consumer taxes in some specific cases;
• in the Chapter ’’Financial and Budget Arrangements” a transition 
period for gradual flow of the levies to the EU budget;
• in the Chapter ’’Justice and Interior; Schengen” a transition period for 
technical safety of the Ruzyne airport;
• in the Chapter ’’Agriculture” a transition periods for several technical 
arrangements in veterinary area, wines sector, utilisation of land etc.
The requests for transition periods -  like the seven ones in the area of 
environment protection - are usually based on financial reasons and on the 
shortage of time within which the Czech Republic would not be able to 
implement the norms of the EU.186 In the single area of water management the 
investment need amounts to 100 bil Koruna.187 Also the absorption capacity in
184 Pavel Telicka, Aktualni Slav jednani o pristoupeni CR k EU (Current State of the Talks of 
Czech Republic’s Accession to EU), Mezinarodni politika: 1/2001,p.6.
185 Telicka, Aktualni stav jednani ... , pp.6-7.
186 Bedrich Moldan, Jiri Beran, Soucasny stav vyjednavani v kapitole: Zivotni prostredi 
(Current State of Negotiations in the Chapter Environment), Smer Evropska unie: 4/2000,




























































































the individual policy sectors is limited. So, Czech activity in adoption of the EU 
environment norms increased considerably and the EU-Department of the 
Ministry of Environment became a respected driving force of the process. Czech 
experts, however, lacked a clearly defined national environmental policy. They 
argued that the Czech Republic was barely able to reflect on the development of 
the EU-environmental policy on a theoretical level.188
Prague supported the growing tendency to differentiate among the 
countries of the first negotiating group.189 In preparation of its negotiating 
position, Czech policy sought to retain the customs union with Slovakia - in one 
form or other. Even if Slovakia declared it would not ask the European 
Commission for a special arrangement concerning the Czech-Slovak customs 
union, a parallel accession would be the easiest solution for both. Similarly the 
extension of Schengen agreement just to the Czech-Slovak border was widely 
perceived as an absurd and counter-productive prospect.
Parallel to more largely positive view of the EU, Czech policy expressed 
freely critical observations regarding policy o f Brussels. Secretary of State 
Telicka moderately criticised the EU attitude of the accession-talks. The EU did 
not share the Czech interest to increase the pace of negotiations. Sometimes, 
Brussels failed to respond quickly enough to Prague’s request for further 
information regarding its negotiating position.190 Minister Kavan criticised on 
indication from Brussels that the admission of the ECE states could depend on 
the agreement between the EU and Poland regarding the agriculture policy. He 
stressed that each accession state has to be judged on its merits. The Czech 
Republic is going to insist on equal treatment with the other EU-member states -  
including the agriculture policy.191 In 2001 Prague, like Hungary and Poland 
earlier on, started a diplomatic offensive. Prime Minister Zeman announced 
during his official visit to Belgium that Czech diplomacy was ready to withdraw 
some of its earlier announced requests for transition periods in the sphere of 
taxation in telecommunications, propellants and construction works. Prague 
obviously tried to influence the decision making process of the EU regarding the
norem EU’(CR Will Seek Transition Periods For Implementation of EU Norms), Lidove 
noviny, 21.1.1999, p.6.
188 Petr Jehlicka, Dusledky rozsireni pro environmentalni politiku EU (Enlargement: 
Implications for EU-Environmental Policy), Evropska temata CEA: 1/2000, pp.10-12.
189 EU uvazuje o nove strategic (EU Considers a New Strategy), Hospodarske noviny,. 
17.3.1999, p.2
190 See: Udalosti a rozhodnuti EU. Duben 2000 (Events and EU Decisions. April 2000) in 
Smer Evropska unie: 3/2000, p. 9.
191 Nase diplomacie must Bruselu pripomfnat zavazky z Helsinky (Our Diplomacy Has to 





























































































composition of the first group of the countries, which might be admitted into the 
EU in the first place.
With the progress of the negotiations the confidence of the Czech 
diplomacy has been growing. Prague exercised growing pressure on the EU in 
co-ordination with the other accession countries, primarily with the ’’Visegrad 
three”. The expectation of a precisely set date of accession has been growing. As 
the French presidency in 2001 focused primarily on the preliminary institutional 
preparation of the EU for enlargement, Prague expected a progress of 
enlargement during the Swedish presidency in 2001. A new negotiation 
methodology was required for the advanced negotiating phase. Czech policy 
was confident; the negotiations could and should be concluded by the end of 
2001.
Prague’s capacity to follow the EU development remained circumscribed. 
Unlike Polish diplomacy, Prague only gradually started to elaborate its strategic 
vision of the EU. Vaclav Havel’s federalist vision of the EU has been largely 
shared by the government and the ’’coalition of four” and rejected by the 
opposition ODS and KSCM. The government’s expectation on the 2004 IGC 
focused on a clear delimitation of competencies of the three levels of EU 
policymaking, integration of the Human Right Charter into the EU treaties, 
general reorganisation of the treaties, further development of the ESDP and the 
Nice left-overs. Czech policy is deeply interested in maintenance of the 
American role in Europe.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Preparing for membership of the integrated EU and NATO structures became 
the most important factor of external influence co-shaping the transformation 
process within the Czech Republic. The role of the EU was less pronounced 
during the early years of the Klaus government. The laissez-faire state, 
combined with the preference for the recommendations of liberal economic 
institutions like the IMF, World Bank and the OECD, fit better into the 
government’s rather loose concept of transformation policy. The integration of 
the Czech Repub he seemed not to be the single top priority of the government’s 
policy-making. For some time, some Czech political leaders even behaved as if 
they had a sensible alternative to EU membership.
A dichotomy developed in Czech integration policy against this 
background, on the one hand a reserved approach of some neo-liberal 
politicians, and on the other a gradual implementation of the European 
Agreement and later application for EU membership. The evident discrepancy 




























































































had in 1992-1996 (dominated by the assertive ODS and Vaclav Klaus) and 
because international affairs (except for relations with Germany) played a 
secondary role in Czech politics. Thus, integration policy was an arena where 
politicians could not gain or lose unless direct interests were effected - like those 
of producers or consumers. This is true partly even at present and the EU does 
not represent a priority in party politics. Unlike today, however, in the pre-1998 
period (before the Tosovsky government came to office) members of the 
government used to express their views with a great deal of self-esteem, often 
unprepared and “off-record”, thereby contradicting their own government and 
party programmes, their party colleagues and even their own earlier positions.
The loss, caused by this “provisional character” (Anneke Hudalla) of 
Czech policy was substantial: it resulted in a passive approach to most elements 
of EU policymaking, delays in implementation of the pre-accession strategy and 
in the “education” of the political elite as well as the public (a referendum on 
membership of the EU being nearly inevitable). Prague did not explore the 
potential of co-operative links with other EU states. In the case of Czech- 
German relations, the lack of commonality in approach to the EU influenced 
considerably their bilateral relations. It made it impossible to exploit the 
historically unprecedented parallelity of strategic interests in Czech and German 
European policy and explore its limits. Moreover it impeded a settlement of the 
issues arising from their tragic past.
We witnessed a peculiar phenomenon over the years of 1992-1997: Czech 
diplomacy, including the external activities of the Presidency, contributed to the 
pressures, which co-shaped the EU strategy of enlargement. The Czech 
conservative government, however, increasingly had to accept the EU’s pre­
accession strategy and gradually speed up its implementation. On both sides of 
the process of enlargement the actors were switching from an active role to a 
reactive adjustment in their strategies and policies. The influence of the EU 
continuosly grew as the transformation proved to be of a long term nature and 
needed more concentrated effort than the Czech government was originally 
ready to admit to. It were only the governments of Josef Tosovsky and Milos 
Zeman which fully overcame the dichotomy in Czech integration policy and 
arrived at a conjunction of the transformation process and of the pre-accession 
strategy. Much more complicated however remains the implementation of the 
strategy. Even if the Czech policy has increasingly focused on the preparation 
for accession of the EU from the final period of the Vaclav Klaus government in 
1997, the CSSD government was able only gradually able to speed up its efforts 




























































































The agenda of the Czech policy is extremely overcrowded; the 
bureaucratic institutions are not efficient enough, the reservoir of patience and 
understanding on the side of the public nearly spent and the ability of the 
minority government to guarantee the administrative implementation of the 
already internalised EU-norms limited. It has taken a great effort to translate the 
positive attitude of the majority of Czech class politique towards the European 
integration into practical action. The EU-accession has been accepted as a 
prospect by most of the political parties -  even if with little enthusiasm in the 
case of the leadership of the liberal ODS. Such a reserved approach to the EU- 
accession as well as the ongoing absence of a convincing consensus on EU- 
integration as a whole can impact negatively on the public opinion just at the 
moment of the envisaged public vote on Czech membership to the EU. The 
dichotomy in Czech integration policy was largely overcome. It has persisted, 
however, mainly in the circles of the ODS (and the KSCM) causing confusion 
of the embryonic national discourse on European integration with possible 
political implications.
Vladimir Handl
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